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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the effects of the largest national kidney-exchange
network, National Kidney Registry (NKR), on the speed of finding a transplant and the
quality of donors in participant hospitals. It also examines the effect of surgeons in the
network-adoption decision of hospitals.
The prohibition of monetary transactions for human organs under U.S. law generates
a shortage of kidneys available for transplant. In 2017, about 100,000 patients were
waiting on the long wait-lists to receive a kidney for transplant. Creation of distinct
kidney-exchange networks that find compatible matches between patients who each have
willing but incompatible living kidney donors reduced this shortage.
This dissertation uses the data from the scientific registry of transplant recipients
and the National Kidney Registry data on the list of participant hospitals by year. The
first chapter estimates the change in the probability of receiving a transplant conditional
on wait-time for patients after a hospital adopts the NKR network. Using survival analysis
accounting for the competing risks, I find that the probability of finding a transplant from
a living donor increases by 0.25 percentage points in hospitals participating in the network.
This positive effect is mainly driven from the additional indirect-living transplants that
these networks can accommodate through exchange transplants.
The second chapter investigates how the quality of living donors changes as the use
of the NKR network expands. I use the variation in the period before and after the adoption
of NKR by hospitals and run a difference-in-differences method. Further, I use a Coarsend
Exact Matching to correct for the imbalance between treatment and control groups. My
ii
finding suggests that the quality of living donors as measured by age, body mass index,
and blood type decreases in participant hospitals. Specifically, I show that living donors in
NKR affiliated hospitals are on average 8 months older, have 0.19 points higher body mass
indexes, and are 3.8 percent less likely to have an O blood-type.
The final chapter analyzes the fragmentation in the participation of hospitals in these
networks. We (with Bobby W. Chung) investigate the influence of surgeons in expanding
the use of the NKR by hospitals. We find that hospitals that are connected through mutual
surgeons are more likely to adopt the NKR network. Specifically, we find that one more
adoption by connected hospitals increases the probability of the focal hospital to adopt by
about 4 percentage points. This trend shows a diminishing magnitude as the number of
connected hospitals increases. This effect is stronger for surgeons that have performed a
larger number of transplant surgeries and for hospitals that have more than one mutual
surgeon.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of the National Kidney
Registry on the Probability of
Receiving a Transplant
1.1 Introduction
A kidney transplant is the preferred method of treatment for End-Stage Renal
Disease (ESRD) patients. It increases the life expectancy of the recipients of transplants by
ten years on average (Wolfe et al. 1999; APD 2018). A transplant is also much less costly
than dialysis, the alternative treatment. Each kidney transplant for a Medicare beneficiary
saves the government about $270,000 in present value (Wolfe et al. 1999; Held et al. 2016).
Between the increase in life expectancy and the costs saved, each transplant generates $1.1
million in social value (Held et al. 2016). However, there is a significant shortage of kidneys
available for transplant. In 2018, approximately 110,000 patients were waiting on the wait
list for a kidney transplant (OPTN 2018).
The growing difference between quantity supplied and quantity demanded for
transplantable kidneys, and the hefty cost of dialysis precipitated the search for a solution
to alleviate the shortage of kidneys. Creation of kidney-exchange networks, which provide
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a market that enables patients with living but incompatible donors to swap donors, was the
solution proposed by Roth et al. (2004). The previous literature has focused on expanding
the number of transplants from creating a large pool of available patient-donor pairs in
kidney-exchange networks.1 However, the literature lacks an empirical evaluation of the
magnitude of the effect of national kidney-exchange networks in expanding the number of
transplants.
This paper is the first to empirically investigate the causal effect of the adoption
of the largest national network, the National Kidney Registry (NKR), by a hospital on
the probability of receiving a transplant conditional on wait-time for patients. I use a
survival analysis estimation to capture the effect of hospitals’ decision on joining NKR
on the probability of receiving a transplant for patients. Furthermore, to account for the
existence of other events, other than receiving a transplant, that a patient can experience
waiting on the wait-list, I use a survival analysis with competing risks following Hinchliffe
and Lambert (2013) and Royston and Parmar (2002).
My results suggest that NKR participation increases the probability of receiving a
living transplant conditional on wait-time by 0.25 percentage points. The extra number of
living transplants that are generated are mainly due to the expansion of the indirect living
transplants through exchange transplants. Furthermore, the results provide some evidence
for substitution between deceased transplants and living transplants.
1.2 Institutional Background
For an ESRD patient, a kidney transplant is the preferred method of treatment
compared to dialysis, due to its higher life expectancy and lower cost. The life expectancy
of the recipients of a transplant is on average ten years higher than patients on dialysis
1The original idea started with Roth et al. (2004) and Roth et al. (2005) who introduced the idea of
emerging national kidney-exchange networks. Ashlagi and Roth (2014) focused on expanding the original
model, to an alternative that provides incentives for hospitals to register all of their patient-donor pairs in
these national networks. Agarwal et al. (2018) estimated the additional number of transplants from merging
all kidney-exchange networks into the largest national network in the United States. Teltser (2018) evaluated
the additional number of transplants created from kidney exchanges using differences in the patient’s local
exchange activity over time.
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(Wolfe et al. 1999; APD 2018). In addition, 7% of the annual budget of Medicare is spent
on ESRD patients, the majority of which is used to finance dialysis cost (Agarwal et al.
2018). A kidney transplant for a Medicare beneficiary saves the government about $270,000
in present value (Wolfe et al. 1999; Held et al. 2016). These cost savings are even more
substantial for a privately insured patient (Irwin et al. 2012).2.
Before 2004, the only option for an ESRD patient with a willing but incompatible
living donor was waiting on the deceased-donor list for a cadaver kidney. The shortage
of transplantable kidneys, created from the prohibition against monetary compensation of
human organs by United States law, generates the need for creative solutions to make better
use of the incompatible living donors.3 The introduction of kidney exchanges provided the
opportunity of donor swapping for incompatible patient-donor pairs (Roth et al. 2005). In
addition to the extra number of transplants created by making better use of incompatible
living donors, a transplant from a living donor has a higher quality. A transplant from a
living donor has on average 12 years higher graft survival rate, compared to a transplant
from a deceased donor (APD 2018).
Initially, kidney exchanges were managed by single hospitals within the population
of incompatible patient-donor pairs in that hospital. The need for a thick marketplace
constituting a larger pool of patients and donors emerged across hospital kidney-exchange
programs, starting from small, local networks, and expanding to three national ones. Today,
there are numerous single-hospital programs, several multi-hospital ones, and three major
national pairing organizations each with some hospital participants in the United States.
The leading national pairing organization in the U.S. is the National Kidney Registry
(NKR). The NKR was the first major network to organize living-donor kidney exchanges
nationwide since 2007 effectively. Medical-compatibility and some recipients’ preferences
2“Typical patients covered by commercial insurance can expect to become Medicare primary well before
they receive a kidney transplant. If these patients are transplanted preemptively before starting dialysis,
there is a net benefit to the commercial payer of $250,000 to $400,000 for cost avoidance during the 33
months Medicare is the secondary payer, and to Medicare, the net benefit will be over $100,000 for the
average of 16 months Medicare would become primary before transplantation.”(Irwin et al. 2012)
3According to 42 U.S. Code §274e “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive,
or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce.”
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regarding their donors is the base of pairing in this network. The NKR runs the matching
on a daily basis. Match-runs maximize the number of potential transplants, after giving
priority to some hard-to-match patients. Once a match was accepted, the NKR imposes a
strict timetable and sets forth rigid guidelines for the transportation of kidneys between
hospitals. The NKR charges hospitals roughly 4,000 dollars per transplant to cover
operational expenses, in addition to the annual membership fee (Ellison 2014). The number
of exchange transplants grew gradually as hospitals’ adoption of NKR expanded following its
introduction in 2007 (Figure 1.1), and there are about a hundred hospitals that are currently
participating in this network. The NKR is still the leading network in accommodating
across-hospital kidney-exchange transplants (Figure 1.2), and as of July of 2018, they have
facilitated about 2,800 kidney transplants (NKR 2018).
The other national networks are the Alliance for Paired Donation and Kidney Paired
Donation Pilot Program of United Network for Organ Sharing which started operating in
2007 and 2010, respectively.4 Despite a large number of hospital participants in these two
networks, the total number of transplants they have facilitated together is about one-fifth
of the number of transplants in the NKR.5 This is mainly due to their stricter matching
criteria, and their weaker reputation compared to the NKR. As Figure 1.2 shows, these
two national networks together with all the other local networks constitute a small part of
across hospitals exchange transplants. Therefore, the focus of my analysis is on the NKR
for the remainder of this paper.
4The United Network for Organ Sharing is the private, non-profit organization that manages the organ
transplant system of the United States under contract with the federal government.
5A large number of hospitals participating in the other two national networks are mainly because these
networks are free of charges. Hospitals’ participation in these three networks are not mutually exclusive,
but the other two networks facilitated a very small number of across hospital exchange transplants, overall.
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1.3 Empirical Framework
1.3.1 Single-Risk Survival Analysis
In the single-risk survival model, T is defined as the number of months a patient
remains on the wait list for a kidney transplant. The event of interest is receiving a deceased
or a living transplant. All patients start their search for a kidney at t = 0, irrespective of
calendar time. The probability density function of T , f(t), gives the probability that the
event of interest has occurred by time t. The hazard function, hi(t), is defined as the
conditional probability that a patient, who has remained on the wait list for a period from
0 to t, receives a transplant in the interval of (t, t+ dt), and it is defined by
hi(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ Ti < t+ dt|Ti ≥ t)
dt
. (1.1)
The hazard rate is modeled as a function of exogenous individual-level covariates x capturing
the corresponding increase or decrease in risk associated with each of the characteristics.
Thus, the hazard function is
hi(t|xi) = h0(t)exp(β′xi), (1.2)
where the baseline hazard function h0(t) describes the risk of the hazard for an individual
with xi = 0. The model can be written in terms of the cumulative hazard function as
Hi(t|xi) =
{∫ t
0
h0(u)du
}
exp(β′xi) = H0(t)exp(β′xi). (1.3)
One common approach to estimate the above model is to make an assumption about the
functional form of the baseline hazard function. I use a flexible parametric version of the
Cox model introduced by Royston and Parmar (2002), which uses a cubic spline function
of log time to model the logarithm of the baseline cumulative hazard function. Thus, (1.3)
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can be written as
lnHi(t|xi) = lnH0(t) + β′xi = s(ln(t)) + β′xi. (1.4)
The idea of spline smoothing of the baseline hazard distribution was originally suggested
by Efron (1988). Natural cubic spline functions, s(z), are cubic splines that are bounded
to be linear at the endpoint knots kmin and kmax. In addition, m internal knots can be
specified between the two endpoints kmin < k1 < .... < km < kmax, and the complexity of
the model depends on the number of such nodes. The natural cubic spline of z = log(t) can
be written as
s(z) = γ0 + γ1z + γ2υ1(z) + ...+ γm+1υm(z), (1.5)
in which the υj also known as the basis function is determined for j = 1, ...,m using
υj(z) = (z − kj)3+ − ηj(z −Kmin)3+ − (1− ηj)(z −Kmax)3+, (1.6)
and,
ηj =
kmax − kj
kmax − kmin , (z − a)
3
+ = max(0, (z − a)3).
Since the derivative of cubic spline function is well-defined, the hazard function is
easy to calculate. Specifically, to test the hypothesis that the probability of receiving a
transplant conditional on wait-time varies between patients who are in an NKR hospital,
and the non-NKR ones, I specify the hazard function as
lnHihy(t|X) = s(ln(t)) +NKRhyβ1 +Xihyβ2 + POPhyβ3 + τy + σh, (1.7)
where NKR is a dummy variable equal to one if the patient was listed in an NKR affiliated
hospital after the adoption day of the hospital, and zero otherwise. The set of regressors
in Xihy includes personal controls since patients have different probabilities of finding a
transplant based on their medical and demographic characteristics. I use the patient’s
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age, gender, race, education, body-mass index (BMI), Panel Reactive Antibody (PRA),
O blood-type dummy, and a dummy for patients under Medicare as control variables.
Furthermore, to account for the differences in the number of patients each hospital receives,
I use the United States Bureau of the Census data to include a control for the population of
the state where the hospital is located in over time, POPhy. Finally, all estimates include a
vector of hospital dummies, σh, that control for mean differences in the hazard rate across
hospitals, and year dummies, τy, that control for the changes in the hazard rate over time
common to all hospitals.
In single-risk survival analysis, subjects are followed until either they experience the
event of interest or are censored. In other words, we observe only the minimum of T and
C, where C is the censoring time. This setup assumes that the censoring mechanism is
non-informative, and anyone in the censored population should have the same likelihood
function. More specifically, the censored individual should acquire no information regarding
the expectation of survival of that observation. (Rodriguez 2007)
Competing-risk arises when individuals are at risk of experiencing more than one
type of event, in which the occurrence of one of them might preclude the incidence of others.
The existence of competing-risk violates the above assumption because some of the censored
population that experience a competing-risk convey information regarding the survival of
those observations. Estimating the difference in the transplant rate without accounting for
competing-risk can result in biased estimation, and the direction of bias depends on the
frequency of the different types of competing events in the treatment group. For example,
if the censored observations in NKR hospitals have a higher rate of death while waiting,
single-risk survival estimation would result in an upward bias in the probability of receiving
a transplant in NKR affiliated hospitals.
1.3.2 Competing-Risk Survival Analysis
In survival analysis, subjects are often at risk of more than one mutually exclusive
event, and the incident of one of them may prevent the event of interest from ever happening.
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For example, the probability of being removed from the wait list due to receiving a transplant
depends upon the removal rate due to death while waiting, and removal due to other reasons.
Figure 1.3 depicts the difference in hazard definition between single-risk and competing-risk
survival analysis models.
When competing risks are present, one should consider both the survival time and
the event type (k = 1, ...,K). The cause-specific cumulative incidence function for cause
k is defined as Fk(t) = Pr(T ≤ t, cause = k), which describes the probability of receiving
a transplant by time t accounting for the competing events. The cause-specific hazard
function for cause k, hki (t), is defined as the conditional probability that a patient, who has
not experienced any of the competing events in the period of 0 to t, gets a transplant in the
interval of (t, t+ dt). Thus, the cause-specific hazard is defined by
hki (t) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ Ti < t+ dt, cause = k|Ti ≥ t)
dt
. (1.8)
Based on equation (1.8), the cause-specific hazard for event k depends on the cause-specific
hazard of all the other K − 1 events and requires separate models for each event. The
problem with fitting separate models for each cause is that it does not allow the inclusion
of shared parameters. Hinchliffe and Lambert (2013) use the flexible parametric model
introduced by Royston and Parmar (2002) to fit one model for all events simultaneously,
which enables one to estimate the direct effect of covariates on the cause-specific cumulative
incidence function of event k without the need to model the other events. They transform
the data set by stacking it in a format where each individual has k rows of data, one for
each event, so each patient is at risk of experiencing any of the events.6 This will allow one
to incorporate both covariates that are shared across events, and covariates that vary for
each event. To test the difference in the probability of receiving a transplant in NKR and
6Table 11 in the Appendix demonstrates how the data should look after they have been expanded.
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non-NKR hospitals in the presence of competing risks, I specify the hazard function as
lnHkihy(t|X) =
4∑
j=1
Cj(ln(t)) +
4∑
j=1
βjCj(ln(t))×NKRhy+
4∑
j=1
δjCj(ln(t))×Xihy +
4∑
j=1
θjCj(ln(t))× POPhy + τy + σh,
(1.9)
where
∑4
j=1Cj(ln(t)) are the four cause indicators depicted in Table 4. I fit a stratified
model with four baselines by including the four cause indicators as both main effects and
time-dependent effects. The interaction between NKR and the cause indicators captures
the distinct treatment effect for each of the four causes. More specifically, it captures the
effect of NKR on the probability of experiencing any of the four events. Also, by including
the interaction of each of the cause indicators with covariates, I allow for each covariate to
vary by each cause separately. Finally, year and hospital fixed effects are shared across the
four events.
1.4 Data Description
This study used data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR). The SRTR data system includes data on all donor, wait-listed candidates, and
transplant recipients in the US, submitted by the members of the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provides oversight to the activities
of the OPTN and SRTR contractors. Each registration provides detailed medical and
demographic characteristics of the individual patients, their registration date, their status
on the wait list, including removal from the waiting list if applicable, the removal reason,
and the removal date. I merge patients data with the data from the NKR network on the
list of hospitals in the network by adoption year.
I restrict my analysis to all the patients registered beginning in January 2000 through
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September 2017. Observations before 2000 are omitted due to the poor reporting quality of
the variables of interest. I drop individuals who were removed due to improvement in the
candidate’s condition, refusing transplant, closure of their hospital, transfer to kidney and
pancreas waiting list, receiving a transplant in another country, and removal by error or
other unknown reasons. Additionally, I drop patients who have a removal code but do not
have a registration or removal date, as the wait-time duration is unknown for them. Table
1.1 reports the summary statistics of transplant wait-time.
The duration is the number of months a patient stays on the transplant wait list, and
the event of interest is receiving a transplant. Individuals are tracked from 1 to 60 months,
the mean and median wait-time of patients are 24.74, and 19.9 months, respectively. They
are either removed from the waiting list in this period or are still waiting on the list.7
Removal can be due to receiving a transplant (from a deceased or a living donor) or due
to death on the wait list, getting too sick for a transplant, being transferred to another
hospital, getting a transplant in another hospital, and losing track of the patient. There
are 505,686 observations in the dataset, from which 227,951 (45.07%) receive a transplant.
I use the described data to test whether the probability of receiving a transplant,
conditional on wait-time, is different between patients who are registered in NKR affiliated
hospitals and the non-affiliated ones.
1.5 Results
The baseline hazard model is estimated using a cubic spline function with four
knots.8 The number of knots is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
(Royston and Parmar 2002).9 Table 1.3 reports the result of estimating (1.7) using the
flexible parametric proportional-hazard model.10 The hazard rate for the group of patients
7For patients who are still waiting, I consider the last day of the data as their last follow-up date.
8The results are not sensitive to the selection of the number of knots. I provide a robustness check for
results using a different number of knots for the baseline hazard in Table 10 in the Appendix.
9Table 9 in the Appendix depicts the differences in the AIC between assigning a different number of knots
for the baseline hazard function.
10The correct choice of spline function for the baseline hazard gives an estimate which is very close to Cox
model estimation. I provide an estimation of equation (1.7) using a Cox model in Table 1.3 for comparison.
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in NKR affiliated hospitals indicates that controlling for the characteristics of patients, those
that are listed in NKR hospitals have a higher probability of receiving a transplant, but this
difference is not statistically significant. The result in Table 1.3 relies on the assumption
that anyone who was listed on the waiting list and did not receive a transplant is in the
censored population with the same likelihood function. However, the censored population
in the single-risk estimation consists of patients who died or got too sick for a transplant,
patients who were transferred to another hospital, and patients who got a kidney transplant
in another hospital.
I exploit the information on reasons for removal from the wait list to allow for
estimating a cause-specific hazard model. Table 1.4 shows the hazard rates estimated
from (1.9). According to the results, patients who were listed in NKR affiliated hospitals,
compared to non-NKR ones have higher probabilities of transplant, death (or getting too
sick) while waiting, and receiving a transplant in another hospital, but none of these are
statistically significant. However, patients listed in hospitals that adopted NKR are 0.34
percentage points less likely to be transferred to another center.
The target of the NKR, and kidney-exchange networks in general, is expanding the
use of incompatible living donors. Therefore, I extend the estimation further to capture the
difference in the rate of transplants from living and deceased kidney-donors in NKR and
non-NKR affiliated hospitals, separately. Table 1.5 reports the result of this estimation,
indicating that patients who were listed in NKR affiliated hospitals are 0.25 percentage
points more likely to receive a transplant from a living donor. The coefficient on the deceased
transplants indicates that patients in NKR affiliated hospitals have a lower probability of
receiving a transplant from a deceased donor as well. Nonetheless, this coefficient is not
statistically different from zero at 10% confidence interval. These results are suggesting
that there is some degree of substitution from deceased-donor transplants to living-donor
ones after the adoption of the NKR by a hospital.
Furthermore, to capture the effect of NKR on exchange transplants, I expand the
competing events by dividing living donors into the exchange, and direct-living transplants.
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Table 1.6 and Figure 1.4 report the result of this estimation. According to Table 1.6,
NKR increases the probability of receiving an exchange and direct-living transplant by 1.90
and 0.11 percentage points, respectively. This difference is more pronounced in Figure 1.4.
While there is a substantial difference in the rate of exchange transplants between NKR and
non-NKR affiliated hospitals, the difference in transplants from direct-living and deceased
donors are small, and not statistically significant at 5%.
The findings in this section confirm that participation in the NKR network by
a hospital increases the probability of receiving a transplant from a living-donor for
its patients. Furthermore, most of this increase comes from the tremendous growth
in the probability of obtaining an exchange transplant, where patients can swap their
incompatible living donors. While there is no significant improvement in the probability of
receiving a transplant in NKR hospitals, the substitution from deceased-donor transplants
to living-donor ones can improve the quality of transplants for patients listed in NKR
hospitals. In the following section, I investigate the effect of the adoption of this exchange
platform on the quality of donors that patients bring into these hospitals.
1.6 Conclusion
The number of kidney-exchange transplants grew gradually after the introduction
of the National Kidney Registry (NKR) in 2007, increasing the pool of patient-donor pairs
willing to participate in an exchange. With the expansion of hospitals’ use of NKR, the
questions that arise are how effective is this network in expanding the number of transplants.
This paper analyzes the effects of hospitals’ adoption of NKR network on the probability of
receiving a transplant conditional on wait-time using variation in NKR adoption by different
hospitals and years.
This study uses the unique data set of the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR) merged with NKR data on participant hospitals. The data allow me
to identify the hospitals’ participation status in the NKR in each year, subsequent medical
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and demographic characteristics of patients and donors, the registration date, status on the
wait list including reasons for removal, and the removal date of patients in these hospitals.
The estimates suggest that hospitals NKR participation increases the probability
of receiving a living transplant for their patients. This larger number of transplants are
accommodated by expanding the use of incompatible patient-donor pairs through exchange
transplants. One of the surprising findings of this study is that participation in NKR does
not have a significant effect in increasing the probability of receiving a transplant overall,
but it induces substitution from the deceased kidney transplant to a living one. A relatively
lower quality living donor is preferred to a transplant from a deceased donor, due to their
higher graft survival rate.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistic of Transplant Wait Time by NKR Participation
Total NKR Non-NKR
Mean Waiting Time (Months) 24.74 22.74 25.52
Median Waiting Time (Months) 19.9 17.83 20.8
Maximum Follow-up (Months) 60 60 60
Number of Patients 505,686 141,365 364,321
Number of Hospitals 287 98 189
Mean of Removal Due to:
Transplants 0.451 0.349 0.490
Living-Transplants 0.154 0.146 0.157
Deceased-Transplants 0.297 0.203 0.334
Death or too Sick for Transplants 0.164 0.131 0.177
Transferred Patients 0.042 0.023 0.049
Transplants Elsewhere 0.056 0.046 0.059
Exchange Transplants 0.015 0.024 0.012
Direct-Living Transplants 0.139 0.122 0.145
Note: The sample includes every patient who was registered on the wait list to receive a transplant between
January 2000 to July 2017.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistic of Competing Events by NKR Participation
Total NKR Non-NKR
Number of Removal Due to:
Transplants 227,951 49,282 178,669
Living-Transplants 77,719 20,571 57,148
Deceased-Transplants 150,232 28,711 121,521
Death or too Sick for Transplants 82,968 18,576 64,392
Transferred Patients 21,022 3,265 17,757
Transplants Elsewhere 28,323 6,550 21,773
Exchange Transplants 7,580 3,340 4,240
Direct-Living Transplants 70,139 17,231 52,908
Note: The sample includes every patient who was registered on the wait list to receive a transplant between
January 2000 to July 2017.
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Table 1.3: Probability of Receiving a Transplant
Cubic Spline Model Cox Model
NKR 1.0653 1.0653
(0.045) (0.045)
Patient’s Age 0.9895*** 0.9895***
(0.001) (0.001)
Body Mass Index 0.9780*** 0.9780***
(0.001) (0.001)
O Blood-Type 0.7115*** 0.7116***
(0.007) (0.007)
Panel Reactive Antibody 0.9911*** 0.9911***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female 1.0905*** 1.0905***
(0.007) (0.007)
Black 0.6883*** 0.6884***
(0.012) (0.012)
Other Ethnicity 07153.*** 0.7154***
(0.013) (0.013)
College Education 1.0745*** 1.0745***
(0.011) (0.011)
Medicare 0.9036*** 0.9037***
(0.011) (0.011)
State Population/1000 0.9658 0.9658
(0.022) (0.022)
Observations 498,544 498,544
Year FE Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported with corresponding standard errors. The
probability of receiving a transplant is calculated using a single-risk hazard function by fitting a cubic
spline function for the baseline hazard. I also provide the estimation using a Cox model for robustness
check. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.4: Probability of Being Removed from the Transplant Wait List
(Competing Risks)
All Died or too Sick Transferred Transplant
Transplants for Transplant Elsewhere Elsewhere
NKR 1.0463 1.0422 0.6610*** 1.1004
(0.040) (0.054) (0.077) (0.106)
Patient’s Age 0.9891*** 1.0406*** 0.9873*** 0.9935***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Body Mass Index 0.9771*** 0.9900*** 0.9899*** 0.9772***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
O Blood-Type 0.7152*** 0.9042*** 0.9386*** 0.8352***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
Panel Reactive Antibody 0.9912*** 0.9971*** 0.9946*** 0.9948***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female 1.0921*** 1.0125 1.1002*** 1.0167
(0.007) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016)
Black 0.6586*** 0.8872*** 0.7679*** 0.6453***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.055) (0.035)
Other Ethnicity 0.7110*** 0.7661*** 0.8742** 0.8089***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.058) (0.046)
College Education 1.0915*** 0.8942*** 1.1909*** 1.7825***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.062) (0.109)
Medicare 0.9141*** 1.3578*** 0.7856*** 1.0515
(0.011) (0.022) (0.031) (0.036)
State Population/1000 0.9745 0.9887 0.9997 0.9834
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Observations 498,544
Year FE Yes
Hospital FE Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported with corresponding standard
errors. The results are reported by expanding the data and fitting one model for all k events
simultaneously. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted
with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the
hospital level.
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Table 1.5: Probability of Being Removed from the Transplant Wait List(Competing Risks)
Living Deceased Died or too Sick Transferred Transplant
Transplants Transplants for Transplant Elsewhere Elsewhere
NKR 1.2585*** 0.9369 1.0423 0.6614*** 1.1008
(0.078) (0.051) (0.054) (0.079) (0.106)
Patient’s Age 0.9802*** 0.9944*** 1.0406*** 0.9872*** 0.9934***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Body Mass Index 0.9813*** 0.9758*** 0.9900*** 0.9899*** 0.9772***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
O Blood-Type 0.7854*** 0.6841*** 0.9041*** 0.9386*** 0.8352***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014)
Panel Reactive Antibody 0.9851*** 0.9934*** 0.9971*** 0.9946*** 0.9948***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female 1.133*** 1.0693*** 1.0127 1.1004*** 1.0170
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.017)
Black 0.3699*** 0.8302*** 0.8888*** 0.7690*** 0.6463***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.018) (0.055) (0.035)
Other Ethnicity 0.5277*** 0.8361*** 0.7664*** 0.8741** 0.8091***
(0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.057) (0.046)
College Education 1.4752*** 0.9357*** 0.8943*** 1.1904*** 1.7820***
(0.029) (0.013) (0.011) (0.062) (0.109)
Medicare 0.5476*** 1.1594*** 1.3581*** 0.7853*** 1.0513
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.032) (0.036)
State Population/1000 0.9765 0.9697* 0.9859 0.9971 0.9808
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 498,544
Year FE Yes
Hospital FE Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported with corresponding standard errors. The results
are reported by expanding the data and fitting one model for all k events simultaneously. Coefficient estimates
that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 1.6: Probability of Receiving Different Types of Transplants
Exchange Direct-Living Deceased-Donor
Transplant Transplant Transplant
NKR 2.9072*** 1.1135* 0.9387
(0.307) (0.067) (0.051)
Patient’s Age 0.9816*** 0.9802*** 0.9944***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Body Mass Index 0.9885*** 0.9806*** 0.9757****
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
O Blood-Type 0.6398*** 0.8041*** 0.6841***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.009)
Panel Reactive Antibody 0.9974*** 0.9829*** 0.9934***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 1.1687*** 1.1302*** 1.0694***
(0.034) (0.012) (0.011)
Black 0.3353*** 0.3751*** 0.8301***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.024)
Other Ethnicity 0.5867*** 0.5218*** 0.8359***
(0.072) (0.033) (0.033)
College Education 1.7791*** 1.4439*** 0.9357***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.013)
Medicare 0.5958*** 0.5424*** 1.1592***
(0.039) (0.020) (0.015)
State Population/1000 0.9678 0.9792 0.9710*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 498,544
Year FE Yes
Hospital FE Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported with corresponding standard errors. The
results are reported by expanding the data and fitting one model for all k events simultaneously. Coefficient
estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Figure 1.1: NKR Adoption and Exchange-Transplant Trends
Notes: The NKR was introduced in 2007. From 2007 the number of hospitals that participate in this
network increased every year, and at the same time, the number of exchange transplants increased as
well.
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Figure 1.2: NKR Adoption and Exchange-Transplant Trends
Notes: See Agarwal et al. (2018).
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Figure 1.3: Hazard Definition Difference Between Survival Analysis Models
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Notes: This figure depicts the difference in hazard definition between single-risk and competing-risk
survival analysis models, respectively. In the presence of competing risks, one should consider both the
survival time and the event type (k = 1, ...,K).
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative Incidence of Different Types of Transplants
Notes: The plots capture the probability of being removed from the transplant wait list from exchange,
direct-living and deceased transplants, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of the National Kidney
Registry on the Quality of
Donors
2.1 Introduction
A kidney transplant is the preferred method of treatment for end-stage renal disease
(ESRD) patients because it can increase the life expectancy of the recipients and it is a most
cost-effective option compared to the alternative treatment which is dialysis. However, the
prohibition of monetary transactions for human organs under U.S. law generates a shortage
of kidneys available for transplant. Creation of distinct kidney-exchange networks that find
compatible matches between patients who each have willing but incompatible living kidney
donors reduced this shortage. Previous literature has focused on expanding the number
of potential transplants by creating a thick pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs in
national kidney-exchange networks. However, the effect of such expansions on the quality
of patients and donors interested in kidney exchanges is unknown.1
1Agarwal et al. (2018) provide a mean-comparison of age, BMI, and blood-type of living-donors involved
in exchanges between NKR and non-NKR hospitals, and concludes that except for blood-type, there is no
observable difference between donors in these hospitals.
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The number of exchange transplants grew gradually as hospitals’ adoption of
the largest national network, National Kidney Registry (NKR), expanded following its
introduction in 2007; and as of today, NKR is still the leading network in accommodating
across-hospital kidney-exchange transplants. This paper is the first to empirically
investigate the causal effect of the adoption of the NKR, by a hospital on the expected
quality of donors. Participation in a kidney-exchange network enables patients to swap their
incompatible living donors in a bigger pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs. Therefore,
it increases the marginal value of donors. However, the effect of these networks on the
marginal value of the quality of donors is ambiguous. One might expect to see a decline
in the quality of donors after the adoption of a network if patients are willing to trade
a relatively lower quality donor for shorter wait-time on the waiting list. Alternatively,
kidney-exchange networks can increase the incentive of patients in bringing a high-quality
donor that is more desirable for trade, to improve their chance of finding a compatible
donor.
I use a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of participation in the
NKR on the quality of donors in that hospital. To address the non-random assignment of
treatment and control groups, I use the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) method which
allows for a reduction in the imbalance of covariates across control and treatment groups
following Iacus et al. (2008), Blackwell et al. (2009), and Nilson (2017). One might worry
that even if NKR adoption lowers the average donor’s quality immediately, perhaps over
the long term it improves the quality of donors. To test this hypothesis, I augment the
previous estimates with lead and lag covariates to capture the dynamics of NKR adoption
and quality of donors following (1969) and Autor (2003).
My results suggest that although NKR participation increases the probability of
receiving a living transplant conditional on wait-time, it decreases the quality of living
donors in those hospitals. Specifically, compared to non-NKR affiliated hospitals, NKR
participation increases the age of donors by 8 months, increases the body mass indexes of
donors by 0.19 points, and decreases the pool of O blood-type donors by 3.8 percent. The
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negative effect of NKR on the average donor’s quality is not due to hospitals’ anticipatory
responses before joining NKR, but post-adoption reactions drive it. Finally, I investigate
the effect of NKR adoption on one-year and three-year follow-up outcomes of recipients
after transplant. I find that patients in NKR hospitals have worse outcomes in one year
after transplant follow-up compared to non-NKR hospitals. Recipients of living donors in
NKR hospitals are 0.35% more likely to die before the one year after transplant follow-up,
and 0.29% more likely to require full assistance for their daily activities.
Finally, I investigate the potential mechanisms by which creating a thick marketplace
can affect the pool of available donors for exchange using the moving behavior of patients. I
find no evidence that the decline in the quality of donors is due to patients’ moving behavior
since there is no increase in the distance patients are traveling to NKR member hospitals
after their adoption.
2.2 Institutional Background
For an ESRD patient, a kidney transplant is the preferred method of treatment
compared to dialysis, due to its higher life expectancy and lower cost. Before 2004, the only
option for an end-stage renal disease patient with a willing but incompatible living donor
was waiting on the deceased-donor list for a cadaver kidney. The shortage of transplantable
kidneys, created from the prohibition against monetary compensation of organ donors by
the United States law, pushed researchers to come up with creative solutions to make
better use of the incompatible living donors. Introduction of kidney-exchange provided the
opportunity of donor swapping for incompatible patient-donor pairs (Roth et al. 2005).
Donors can engage in a transplant when they are blood-type and tissue-type
compatible with the recipient of their organ. Blood-type compatibility happens when the
donor does not have a blood protein that the patient lacks. There are two types of blood
proteins, A and B, and the blood type of each individual is an indicator of proteins found
in that person’s blood. An O blood-type stands for the absence of any of these proteins.
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This makes O blood-type donors very valuable since they are blood-type compatible with
a broader range of patients (Danovitch 2009). Tissue-type compatibility happens when the
donor lacks a protein that the patient has an immune response against. The Panel Reactive
Antibody (PRA) is a measure indicating patients tissue-type sensitivity. It reveals the
percentage of the general population with whom the patient is likely tissue incompatible.
For example, a patient with a PRA of 20 is incompatible with 20% of the population.
The donor’s general health status affects the expected length of the graft survival
of a transplant.2 There is a negative relationship between the donor’s age and the graft
survival after transplant (Figure 2.1), where about 21% of kidney transplant failures are the
result of insufficient renal mass due to the higher age of donors (Terasaki et al. 1997). The
donor’s weight is another factor that impacts the length of graft survival. Medical studies
have shown that transplants from obese donors have a higher percentage of acute rejection
episodes, malfunction of the primary allograft, and surgical complications (Espinoza et al.
2006).3 Finally, the risk of kidney-failure is higher for patients whose donors had a history
of hypertension, smoking, or diabetes (Grams et al. 2016).
Initially, kidney-exchanges were managed by single hospitals within the population
of incompatible patient-donor pairs in that hospital. The need for a thick marketplace that
constitutes of a larger pool of patients and donors emerged across-hospital kidney-exchange
programs, starting from small local networks, and expanding to multiple national ones.
Today, there are numerous single-center programs, several multi-center ones, and three
major national pairing organizations each with a number of transplant center participants
in the United States.
The leading national pairing organization in the U.S. is the National Kidney Registry
(NKR), primarily due to the merit of being the first major network to organize exchanges
nation-wide since 2007 effectively. The other national networks are the Alliance for Paired
Donation (APD) and Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program (KPDPP) of United Network
2Graft survival is an estimate of the probability of the transplant functioning at a finite time after
transplantation.
3An allograft is a tissue graft from a donor of the same species as the recipient but not genetically
identical.
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for Organ Sharing (UNOS) which started operating in 2007 and 2010, respectively. Despite
a large number of participants in these two networks, mainly because these networks are
free of charges, the total number of transplants they facilitate together is about one-fifth of
the number of transplants in NKR. Therefore, the focus of my analysis is on the NKR for
the remainder of this paper.
2.3 Empirical Framework
By exploiting the fact that different hospitals adopt the National Kidney Registry
in different years, I assess its causal impact by contrasting changes in the quality of
donors in participant and non-participant hospitals. Specifically, I begin by estimating
a difference-in-differences model of the form
yiht = β0 + β1NKRht + τt + σh + iht, (2.1)
where the dependent variable, yiht, measures the quality of donor i in hospital h and year
t. The variable of interest, NKRht, is a dummy for the adoption of NKR network in a
hospital and year. In addition, the estimation includes a vector of hospital dummies, σh, to
control for mean differences in quality of donors across hospitals, and year dummies, τt, to
control for the average donor’s quality changes over time common to all hospitals.
One of the assumptions of a difference-in-differences method is that the decision
to adopt the NKR by a hospital is random. However, if this decision is not random
but it is made at hospitals with a different set of characteristics and trends, the
difference-in-differences framework fails to address bias resulting from the non-random
assignment of NKR. Therefore, it hinders our understanding of the total contribution of
NKR adoption to the changes in the quality of donors and recipients. Table 12 in Appendix
B shows some evidence for concerns about such effects in the evaluation of NKR adoption,
as NKR hospitals are performing more transplants overall, and they have relatively older
recipients.
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One empirical approach to improve the estimation of causal effects is to create a
control group with distributional characteristics as similar as possible to the treatment
group (Nilsson 2017; Robins, Rotnitzky, and Scharfstein 2000). I use the Coarsened Exact
Matching (CEM) method, which allows for a reduction in the imbalance of covariates across
control and treated groups. The advantage of CEM method, as opposed to the Propensity
Score Matching, is that it is a monotonic imbalance-reducing technique, meaning the balance
between the treatment and control group is chosen ex-ante rather than an iterative ex-post
balance checking process.4 So, it reduces the degree of model dependence and the average
treatment-effect estimation error. Also, the CEM method ensures that modifying the
balance on one covariate does not affect the imbalance of other variables (Iacus et al. 2008;
Blackwell et al. 2009).
In CEM method, data are coarsened temporarily for the matching process, and then
the analysis is performed on the un-coarsened, matched data. For the matching process, I
use the average of recipients’ age and the population of the state that the hospital is located
in for years 2000 to 2007, as variables reflecting the heterogeneity between treatment and
control groups.5 The weighted fixed-effect panel regressions use the weights created in this
procedure.
Alongside these shortcomings, the above discrete specification cannot test the
dynamics of NKR adoption and quality variables. To explore these dynamics, I use the
leads and lags of NKR adoption and expand (2.1) as
yiht =
2∑
τ=0
δ−tNKRh,t−τ +
4∑
τ=1
δ+tNKRh,t+τ + τt + σh + iht, (2.2)
where the summations on the right-hand side allow for two leads or anticipatory effect, and
four lags or post-treatment effect (Angrist and Pischke 2008). The following estimation
4“The Propensity Score Matching methods require the user to set the size of the matching solution
ex-ante and then checks for the balance ex-post. If the balance resulted from this process is not good, the
size should be respecified, until the user obtains an acceptable amount of balance.”(King et al. 2010)
5The period from 2000 to 2007 is the period before the introduction of the NKR. For treatment hospitals
that inaugurate after 2008, I use the average age and distance before they joined NKR, and for control
hospitals that open after 2008, I use the average value of the variables in the reported years.
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allows us to observe the pattern of post-treatment effects to investigate whether the causal
impact of NKR adoption grows over time, or fades away.
Further, I investigate the effect of participation in NKR on transplant outcomes to
capture the net effect of changes in the quality of donors and the probability of receiving a
transplant conditional on wait-time. I perform the same analysis on one-year and three-year
follow-up results after transplant, including controls for the recipient’s characteristics.
Finally, to capture the cause of selection of patient-donor pairs into NKR hospitals,
I investigate the moving behavior of patients. In this process, I focus on the changes in
the travel distance of patients to their hospitals differentiating between NKR and non-NKR
participant ones after this program was introduced.
2.4 Data Description
I use the individual level data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR) file for the years 1988-2017. These data provide all the records for each kidney
waiting list registrations, their status, and the transplants that occurred with or without
association to the deceased donor wait-list. In this paper, I restrict my analysis to all
kidney transplants from the beginning of 2000 until July 2017. The period before 2000 is
omitted due to the poor reporting quality of the variables of interest and the small number
of exchange-transplant incidents in that interval.
The data used in this section focus on all the records for kidney transplants that
occurred, including transplants from living and deceased donors during the years 2000-2017.
For each observation, detailed medical and demographic characteristics of the individual
recipients and donors, who end-up donating, is provided. I investigate the effect of NKR
adoption on the quality of donors, regarding both their compatibility value and their health
status. I use the donor’s age, body mass index (BMI), their history of hypertension,
diabetes, and smoking in determining the health components of the quality of donor, and
their blood type to capture the quality of donors regarding compatibility value. Further,
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to investigate if the different type of recipients in these hospitals originates the change in
the quality of donors, I exploit the effect of NKR participation on the recipients. I estimate
(2.1) using the demographic and medical characteristics of the recipient as the dependent
variable, including recipient’s age, gender, race, body mass index (BMI), blood type, Panel
Reactive Antibody(PRA6), and dummies for college-education, and Medicare. Table 2.1
presents the summary statistics of the data used in this analysis.
The data set provides detailed information on the follow-up results of patients who
receive a transplant.7 To capture the difference in the follow-up outcome of patients, I use
death, hospitalization for follow-up, acute rejection of organ, therapy, activity, mobility and
work status of recipients post-transplant to compare the transplant outcome of recipients in
NKR affiliated hospitals with non-affiliated ones. Table 2.2 describes the summary statistics
of the variables used in this analysis. I also use the distance patients travel for a hospital
to characterize a specific hospital’s value for patients. In generating the distance variable, I
use the supplemental data that I requested from SRTR on the zip-code of patients, donors,
and hospitals.
The data on the network participation of hospitals is acquired from the NKR
network. They provide data on the list of hospitals that joined this network, their adoption
year, and the number of registrants, matches, and transplants for each hospital in each year.
2.5 Results
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the estimates of (2.1), which capture the effect of NKR
adoption on the quality of donors and recipients, respectively. Each column shows a
regression of proxies for quality on hospital and time dummies, and an indicator variable
for NKR adoption, which is equal to one if NKR is present in a given hospital and year and
zero otherwise. The OLS and CEM columns present estimation results for (2.1) with and
6This measure, which can be a value between 0 and 100, indicates the percentage of the general population
with whom the patient is likely incompatible.
7The frequency and time of follow-up vary based on recipients needs. For recipients who had more than
one follow-up in that period, I only consider their last follow-up results.
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without controlling for the non-random assignment of NKR, respectively.
The results in Table 2.3 show the impact of NKR on the quality of donors. Estimates
demonstrate that in hospitals that joined NKR the age and body mass indexes of living
donors are on average higher than the ones that did not participate by 8 months and 0.192
points, respectively. Also, the O blood-type estimate shows that these hospitals receive
3.796% less of living donors with O blood-type. While the rest of the estimates also move
in the direction of lower quality of donors in NKR hospitals (higher hypertension, diabetes,
and smoking history), they are not significant at 10% confidence interval.
Checking the result of the same estimations for deceased-kidney donors provides
a falsification check for the reported results. As the NKR increases the probability of
receiving a transplant from a living donor with no effect on all transplants, we should only
observe differences in the donors of living transplants when comparing NKR and non-NKR
affiliated hospitals. The results under deceased transplant columns show no statistically
significant difference between the donors of deceased transplants. These results confirm
that the trade-off between higher probability of receiving a transplant and lower quality
of donors is happening amongst the recipients of living-donor transplants, and unobserved
differences between NKR and non-NKR hospitals do not drive the difference in the average
donor’s quality.
On the other hand, separate interpretation of the results of equation (2.1) for the
recipients of living and deceased donors creates selection bias. The results from the previous
section confirm that there is some degree of substitution between the recipients of living
and deceased kidney transplants in NKR affiliated hospitals. This substitution can move
the marginal recipient of a living donor to the deceased-kidney waiting list, in the form of
trading a living donor for getting priority on the waiting list. The data can not distinguish
between the recipient of deceased kidney transplants with and without living donors. Thus,
in interpreting the effect of NKR on the quality of recipients, the focus should be on
all transplants. The results in Table 2.4 show that there is no statistically significant
difference between recipients in NKR and non-NKR participant hospitals. Furthermore,
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Table 2.5 captures the effect of NKR participation on the quality of donors controlling for
the characteristics of recipients, and the results are consistent with my findings in Table
2.3.
The results explained above do not provide an understanding of the dynamics of
NKR adoption and quality of donors over time. It is not clear how quickly the donor’s quality
changes after NKR is adopted and whether this effect escalates, stabilizes, or reverts. Also,
if the low quality of donors in a hospital leads to the adoption of the NKR rather than
vice versa, the above estimates would conceal this reverse causality. To investigate these
dynamics, I augment Table 2.3 estimates with leads and lags of NKR adoption. Specifically,
I include two lead variables capturing one and two years before a hospital joins NKR, and
four lags that express years zero to three after participation, and year four onward.8
Figure 2.2 provides an environment for testing if the hospitals that have donors with
higher age and body mass index, or smaller number of O blood-type donors are the ones
who adopt NKR, as opposed to NKR adoption making them prone to get these donors.9
There is no evidence of an anticipatory reaction within hospitals about to join NKR, as
the lead coefficients do not show any specific trends. The lag trends provide evidence for a
sudden decline of the quality of donors right after NKR adoption, with a gradual decline in
the following years.
Finally, I use the follow-up result of patients who received a transplant to investigate
the net effect of the higher probability of receiving a living transplant conditional on
wait-time and the decline in the quality of living donors in NKR participant hospitals.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide the results for the effect of NKR on one-year and three-year after
transplant follow-ups, respectively. These estimates contain a set of patients’ characteristics
to control for the selection bias of patients’ movement from living to deceased donors. Table
2.6 presents some evidence of a worse outcome of recipients in NKR hospitals. According
8Limiting the post-treatment effects to four lags is due to data limitation. The NKR was introduced in
2007 and until 2012 about 70% of hospitals that eventually form the treatment group joined the NKR. It
means that I can observe the fourth lag only for those observations. The pattern in which hospitals join
NKR through years is shown in Table 3.1 in Appendix B.
9Table 2.9 in Appendix B shows the results from which these graphs are depicted.
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to this table, recipients of transplants, regardless of their type, in NKR affiliated hospitals
compared to non-NKR ones are 0.756% more likely to experience acute rejection of organ
one year after transplant. Furthermore, recipients of living kidney transplants in these
hospitals are 0.345% more likely to die in one year after transplant, and 0.288% more likely
to require full assistance for their daily activities. The results show no significant difference
in the follow-up outcome of recipients of deceased kidney donors.
Table 2.7 shows the estimated impact of NKR adoption on recipients’ follow-up
outcome three years after transplant. Results presented in this table do not show a clear
pattern of difference between the recipients’ three-year follow-up outcome in NKR and
non-NKR affiliated hospital.
One explanation for a decline in the quality of donors is that patients with lower
quality donors travel to NKR participant hospitals to expand their chances of finding
a better donor through an exchange of donors. I use the moving behavior of patients
to investigate if the declining quality of donors in NKR participant hospitals is due to
this hypothesis. Figure 2.3 captures the distribution of the Euclidean distance from the
recipients’ zip-code to the hospital’s zip-code. Based on Figure 2.3 the majority of the
recipients are listed in a hospital within their 50 miles radius.10 Assuming patients are
choosing hospitals based on their distance to these transplant centers and some other
quality characteristics of hospitals (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Town and
Vistnes 2001), adoption of NKR should induce some patients with lower quality donors to
travel longer distances to NKR member hospitals to increase the possibility of finding a
higher quality donor.
Table 2.8 shows no evidence of an increase in patients’ travel distance to NKR
participant hospitals after their adoption. Augmenting the above regression with leads and
lags of NKR adoption allows us to observe changes in the moving behavior of patients
through time. Table 2.10 depict the trend of changes in patients’ travel distance to NKR
hospitals. The results are consistent with the above specification, showing no evidence for
10This graph is consistent with previous literature which indicates 70 percent of patients receive a
transplant within the 50 miles radius of their living location(Teltser ).
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an increase in the travel distance of patients to NKR participant hospitals. These patterns
are depicted in Figure 2.4.
2.6 Conclusion
With the rise of kidney-exchange transplants and the introduction of national
networks expanding the pool of patient-donor pairs willing to participate in exchanges,
a question that arises is if such expansions have an impact on patient-donor pairs’ selection
into these networks. This paper analyzes the effects of the adoption of the National Kidney
Registry (NKR) network by hospitals on donors’ quality in those centers using variation in
NKR adoption by different hospitals and years.
In the absence of Kidney-exchange networks, transplants happen if only donors are
compatible matches for their own patients. Whereas, in the presence of exchange networks,
a transplant occurs if the donor is compatible with one of the patients participating in that
network, therefore these networks increase the marginal value of donors. However, the effect
of kidney-exchange networks on the marginal value of the quality of the donor is ambiguous.
The quality of donors decreases if patients are willing to accept a relatively lower quality
donor for spending less time on the waiting list. Alternatively, participation in an exchange
network could increase the incentive of patients to bring high-quality donors that are more
desirable for trade. Thus, these networks can result in an improvement in the quality of
donors.
This study uses the unique data set of the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR) merged with NKR claims on participant hospitals. The data allow
me to identify the hospitals’ participation status in NKR in each year, and their subsequent
patients and donors medical and demographic characteristics. To my knowledge, my study
is the first to consider the selection effects of patient-donor pairs into hospitals after the
adoption of NKR by that center. The estimates suggest that although NKR participation
increases the probability of receiving a living transplant, it has adverse effects on the
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quality of living donors. In participant hospitals, the age and body mass indexes of living
donors increase more compared to non-participant ones, and the proportion of O blood-type
donors decreases. I find that NKR participation impacts on donors are not due to the
anticipatory response of hospitals about to join NKR; rather it is a post-treatment reaction
after adoption. Finally, the effect of NKR adoption on the follow-up outcomes of patients
shows no significant difference between the transplant recipients in NKR and non-NKR
hospitals.
I also investigate the mechanisms by which why NKR adoption has negative effects
on donors’ quality using the moving behavior of patients. In my supplemental sample
acquired from SRTR, I can observe recipients’ travel distance to their hospitals. I observe
no evidence of an increase in the distance they travel to these centers after the hospital’s
adoption of this network. These results are against what one would expect to see in the
presence of the selection of patients with worse quality donors into NKR member hospitals.
Although I find that NKR adoption reduces the quality of donors, I show that this
decline in quality is small, and it does not change the follow-up outcome of patients after
transplant severely. Furthermore, combining these findings with the previous chapter, the
NKR induces an expansion in the use of incompatible living donors through exchanges. A
relatively lower quality living donor is preferred to a transplant from a deceased donor, due
to their higher graft survival rate.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Quality of Recipients and Donors by
Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Recipients’
Age 291,629 48.459 106,274 45.386 185,355 50.221
Body Mass Index 270,439 28.429 98,430 26.916 172,009 29.295
O Blood-Type×100 291,630 45.072 106,274 44.560 185,356 45.366
Panel Reactive Antibody 289,063 18.146 104,664 10.849 184,399 22.287
Female×100 291,630 39.452 106,274 39.316 185,356 39.530
Black×100 291,630 25.027 106,274 13.854 185,356 31.432
Other Ethnicity×100 291,630 6.996 106,274 5.583 185,356 7.806
College Education×100 291,630 42.689 106,274 49.339 185,356 38.875
Medicare×100 291,630 53.770 106,274 35.249 185,356 64.389
distance from current hospital 219,420 74.450 76,775 84.558 142,645 69.009
Donors’
Age 291,624 38.778 106,268 41.214 185,356 37.381
Body Mass Index 284,203 26.929 98,892 26.899 185,311 26.945
O Blood-Type×100 291,630 53.926 106,274 64.485 185,356 47.871
Hypertension History×100 262,362 18.396 78,242 2.763 184,120 25.040
Smoking History×100 256,718 25.800 73,567 25.125 183,151 26.070
Diabetes History×100 262,223 4.400 77,716 0.060 184,507 6.228
Notes: The sample for characteristics of donors and recipients include every patient who received a
transplant between January 2000 to July 2017.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Recipients’ Follow-up by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
N Mean N Mean N Mean
1 Year Follow-up
Death×100 261,514 2.522 99,110 1.378 162,410 3.221
Hospitalized for Follow-up×100 250,057 27.700 94,720 23.555 155,329 30.233
Acute Rejection×100 208,407 5.404 76,895 4.901 131,512 5.698
Therapy×100 177,953 31.018 71,679 31.037 106,273 31.010
Normal Activity×100 227,503 88.625 84,455 91.517 143,046 86.916
Activity with Some Assistance×100 227,503 10.245 84,455 7.815 143,046 11.682
Activity with Full Assistance×100 227,503 1.130 84,455 0.668 143,046 1.402
Working×100 31,926 69.104 13,586 75.865 18,326 64.144
Normal Mobility×100 112,327 91.709 43,839 93.497 68,483 90.564
3 Years Follow-up
Death×100 225,221 4.030 87,796 2.666 137,397 4.904
Hospitalized for Follow-up×100 207,694 21.993 81,477 18.982 126,190 23.935
Acute Rejection×100 195,124 3.990 75,706 3.440 119,398 4.339
Therapy×100 133,538 13.875 55,674 14.705 77,855 13.286
Normal Activity×100 188,552 88.078 72,175 91.041 116,357 86.244
Activity with Some Assistance×100 188,552 10.422 72,175 7.922 116,357 11.968
Activity with Full Assistance×100 188,552 1.500 72,175 1.036 116,357 1.788
Working×100 14,997 75.802 6,605 81.347 8,390 71.466
Normal Mobility×100 95,634 90.457 39,129 92.379 56,503 89.130
Notes: The sample for one-year follow-up consists of the last follow-up of recipients in the period of 1 year
after transplant, and the sample for three-year follow-up consists of the last follow-up of recipients in the
period between one-year and three-year after transplant between January 2000 to July 2017. For recipients
who had more than 1 follow-up in that period, I only consider their last follow-up results. Therapies include
therapy for Anti-viral, Polyoma virus, Photopheresis, Plasmapheresis, Lymphoid Irradiation.
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Table 2.3: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on the Quality of Donors
by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Age 0.0175 -0.128 0.408** 0.642*** -0.400 -0.331
(0.256) (0.261) (0.193) (0.244) (0.375) (0.371)
Body Mass Index 0.0241 0.0172 0.189** 0.192** -0.00527 -0.100
(0.060) (0.069) (0.076) (0.098) (0.084) (0.107)
O Blood-Type×100 -0.919** -0.539 -2.62*** -3.79*** -0.630 0.494
(0.425) (0.552) (0.620) (0.903) (0.485) (1.002)
Hypertension History×100 -1.213* -1.192 0.0837 0.224 -0.562 0.173
(0.665) (0.758) (0.304) (0.342) (0.827) (1.080)
Smoking History×100 0.0290 0.499 1.643 1.471 -0.826 0.472
(0.764) (0.960) (1.253) (1.360) (0.792) (1.014)
Diabetes History×100 -0.0969 0.0689 0.0356 0.287 0.182 0.337
(0.255) (0.296) (0.028) (0.249) (0.362) (0.406)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. I regress the NKR on each characteristic variable individually.
The regressions are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The matching is done on the
average recipients’ age, the population of the state that the hospital is located in before 2008. Coefficient
estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 2.4: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on the Quality of Recipients
by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Age 0.315* 0.207 0.676*** 0.976*** 0.199 0.190
(0.178) (0.175) (0.234) (0.313) (0.232) (0.237)
Body Mass Index -2.199 -3.738 0.0183 0.0699 -2.978 -4.035
(2.196) (3.782) (0.092) (0.114) (2.997) (4.151)
O Blood-Type×100 -0.422 -0.156 -0.246 -0.733 -0.336 0.582
(0.354) (0.431) (0.590) (0.707) (0.465) (0.887)
Panel Reactive Antibody -0.866 -1.981 -0.543 0.296 -0.228 0.815
(1.125) (1.347) (0.998) (1.104) (1.320) (1.549)
Female×100 -0.323 -0.164 -0.108 0.713 -0.138 -0.239
(0.368) (0.378) (0.628) (0.849) (0.456) (0.688)
Black×100 0.217 0.146 0.544 0.310 0.799 1.263
(0.658) (0.671) (0.523) (0.554) (0.869) (0.974)
Other Ethnicity×100 0.275 0.263 0.256 0.545 0.335 0.452
(0.313) (0.332) (0.311) (0.402) (0.363) (0.416)
College Education×100 2.026* 1.797 1.638 1.931 1.677 1.279
(1.153) (1.176) (1.455) (1.662) (1.178) (1.162)
Medicare×100 -0.982 -0.562 -0.831 -1.130 0.0571 1.325
(1.398) (1.531) (1.208) (1.552) (1.612) (2.495)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. I regress the NKR on each characteristic variable individually.
The regressions are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The matching is done on the
average recipients’ age, the population of the state that the hospital is located in before 2008. Coefficient
estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 2.5: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on the Quality of Donors
by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Age -0.102 -0.220 0.303 0.421* -0.464 -0.449
(0.250) (0.247) (0.184) (0.226) (0.360) (0.343)
Body Mass Index 0.0162 0.0191 0.218*** 0.207** -0.0255 -0.0793
(0.060) (0.069) (0.074) (0.092) (0.084) (0.092)
O Blood Type×100 -0.608* -0.529 -2.340*** -3.252*** -0.287 0.00390
(0.324) (0.392) (0.557) (0.818) (0.179) (0.339)
Hypertension History×100 -1.265** -1.262* 0.0796 0.249 -0.755 -0.0493
(0.640) (0.713) (0.317) (0.358) (0.791) (1.063)
Smoking History×100 -0.0300 0.335 1.610 1.384 -0.964 0.106
(0.781) (0.957) (1.311) (1.443) (0.815) (0.926)
Diabetes History×100 -0.139 0.0379 0.0371 0.303 0.105 0.404
(0.258) (0.288) (0.027) (0.257) (0.357) (0.424)
Patient Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. I regress the NKR on each characteristic variable individually.
Controls that are not shown include recipients’ age, body mass index, PRA, dummies for O blood-type,
female, black, other ethnicities, college education, and Medicare. The regressions are weighted using the
Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The matching is done on the average recipients’ age, the population
of the state that the hospital is located in before 2008. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered at the hospital level.
41
Table 2.6: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on Recipients’ One-Year
Follow-up by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Death×100 0.00618 -0.144 0.321* 0.345* -0.152 -0.153
(0.159) (0.203) (0.163) (0.178) (0.207) (0.242)
Hospitalized for Follow-up×100 0.351 -0.715 -0.042 -0.505 0.876 -1.036
(1.466) (1.564) (1.432) (1.740) (1.572) (1.505)
Acute Rejection×100 0.333 0.756* 0.246 0.630 0.409 0.652
(0.431) (0.452) (0.507) (0.599) (0.460) (0.452)
Therapy×100 -2.166 -2.669 -4.171 -3.887 -0.829 -2.129
(2.880) (3.189) (3.181) (3.182) (2.867) (2.939)
Normal Activity×100 -0.628 -2.740 -1.651 -2.724 -0.267 -0.995
(2.263) (2.336) (2.546) (2.865) (2.229) (2.334)
Activity with Some Assistance×100 0.335 2.603 1.365 2.436 -0.036 0.827
(2.249) (2.325) (2.525) (2.848) (2.213) (2.320)
Activity with Full Assistance×100 0.292** 0.138 0.287** 0.288** 0.303 0.168
(0.148) (0.168) (0.127) (0.137) (0.191) (0.205)
Working×100 0.0388 -4.321 2.478 -3.232 -0.780 -3.743
(2.747) (3.117) (2.730) (3.318) (3.590) (2.661)
Normal Mobility×100 -1.333 -1.754 -2.086 -2.448 -1.038 -1.549
(1.802) (1.892) (2.564) (2.737) (1.410) (1.544)
Patient Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. I regress the NKR on each follow-up variable individually.
Controls that are not shown include recipients’ age, body mass index, PRA, dummies for O blood-type,
female, black, other ethnicities, college education, and Medicare. The regressions are weighted using the
Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The matching is done on the average recipients’ age, the population
of the state that the hospital is located in before 2008. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 2.7: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on Recipients’ Three-Year
Follow-up by Transplant Type
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Death×100 -0.227 -0.373* -0.0780 0.00472 -0.356 -0.313
(0.178) (0.218) (0.216) (0.242) (0.257) (0.329)
Hospitalized for Follow-up×100 0.904 0.350 1.090 0.318 0.991 0.216
(1.104) (1.172) (1.128) (1.321) (1.189) (1.193)
Acute Rejection×100 -0.229 0.0833 -0.277 -0.349 -0.143 0.287
(0.362) (0.389) (0.401) (0.428) (0.404) (0.413)
Therapy×100 -1.309 -1.152 -4.199* -5.67** 0.717 1.090
(2.134) (2.289) (2.301) (2.561) (2.198) (2.411)
Normal Activity×100 -1.559 -2.104 -2.035 -2.832 -1.547 -2.481
(1.866) (2.060) (2.015) (2.287) (1.860) (1.861)
Activity with Some Assistance×100 1.605 2.137 2.032 2.909 1.636 2.524
(1.853) (2.043) (2.004) (2.264) (1.836) (1.833)
Activity with Full Assistance×100 -0.0463 -0.0331 0.00258 -0.0770 -0.0887 -0.0427
(0.206) (0.227) (0.196) (0.241) (0.269) (0.297)
Working×100 2.501 0.551 6.083** 5.700 0.711 -2.178
(2.455) (3.023) (2.739) (3.637) (3.239) (3.548)
Normal Mobility×100 -1.636 -2.21** -1.512 -1.604 -2.047* -2.88**
(1.137) (1.095) (1.430) (1.513) (1.148) (1.161)
Patient Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. I regress the NKR on each follow-up variable individually.
Controls that are not shown include recipients’ age, body mass index, PRA, dummies for O blood-type,
female, black, other ethnicities, college education, and Medicare. The regressions are weighted using the
Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The matching is done on the average recipients’ age, the population
of the state that the hospital is located in before 2008. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 2.8: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on Moving Behaviorof Patients
All Living-Donor Deceased-Donor
Transplants Transplants Transplants
OLS CEM OLS CEM OLS CEM
Dependent Variables:
Patient’s Distance -3.928 -5.66** -1.075 -4.607 -5.238** -4.4954*
(2.957) (2.311) (4.916) (4.306) (2.462) (2.495)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each entry is a separate regression. The dependent variable is the distance from patients’ zip-code
to hospitals’ zip-code. The regressions are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. The
matching is done on the average recipients’ age, the population of the state that the hospital is located in
before 2008. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **,
and * respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at hospital level.
44
Table 2.9: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on the Quality of
Donors, years 2005-2017
Age BMI O-Blood Type Hypertension Smoking Diabetes
History History History
NKR 2 0.00165 -0.0120 -1.387 -0.609 -0.372 0.207
(0.301) (0.117) (1.266) (0.440) (1.549) (0.277)
NKR 1 -0.0753 0.0306 -1.494 -0.191 -1.382 0.260
(0.290) (0.138) (1.338) (0.453) (1.782) (0.320)
NKR0 0.250 0.167 -3.762** -0.0731 -0.545 0.469
(0.331) (0.132) (1.592) (0.532) (2.037) (0.465)
NKR1 0.103 0.0333 -5.675*** 0.0748 0.182 0.509
(0.334) (0.142) (1.892) (0.587) (2.210) (0.545)
NKR2 0.319 0.156 -5.845*** -0.185 1.621 0.589
(0.413) (0.172) (2.072) (0.670) (2.318) (0.618)
NKR3 0.252 0.223 -5.028** -0.0814 0.955 0.684
(0.425) (0.184) (2.185) (0.776) (2.545) (0.680)
NKR4 &forward 0.191 0.361 -7.380*** -0.0679 4.413 0.896
(0.512) (0.238) (2.467) (0.840) (2.705) (0.848)
Constant 48.10*** 26.23*** 2.516 1.135*** -0.677 -0.751
(0.472) (0.000) (2.076) (0.401) (2.237) (0.738)
Observations 54,146 52,687 54,147 53,325 53,678 52,768
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variables are the 6 proxies used to measure the quality of donors. The regressions
are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. NKR dummies -2 to 3 are equal to 1 in only 1
year per adopting hospital. NKR4&forward dummy is equal to 1 in every year beginning with the fourth
year of adoption. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***,
**, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 2.10: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on Moving Behavior of
Patients, years 2005-2017
All Living Deceased
Transplants Transplants Transplants
NKR 2 -7.619** -11.31** -0.255
(3.148) (5.019) (3.014)
NKR 1 -6.726** -5.591 -2.172
(3.260) (7.149) (4.072)
NKR0 -14.83*** -13.31** -9.045***
(3.888) (6.471) (3.395)
NKR1 -14.86*** -15.85** -7.200*
(4.668) (7.722) (3.725)
NKR2 -11.76** -7.042 -8.011**
(4.966) (8.501) (3.686)
NKR3 -17.20*** -16.36* -8.852**
(5.102) (9.676) (4.412)
NKR4&forward -15.40*** -6.102 -11.10**
(5.824) (9.420) (4.724)
Constant 17.12*** 15.61*** 17.41***
(2.387) (3.888) (4.003)
Observations 157676 52584 100337
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the distance from patients’ zip-code to hospitals’ zip-code. The regressions
are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. NKR dummies -2 to 3 are equal to 1 in only
1 year per adopting hospital. NKR4&forward dummy is equal to 1 in every year beginning with the fourth
year of adoption. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***,
**, and * respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at hospital level.
46
Figure 2.1: Unadjusted Graft Survival of Kidney Transplants at 10 Years
Notes: See https://www.kidneyregistry.org/ (Accessed July, 2018)
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Figure 2.2: NKR Adoption and its Effect on the Quality of Donors
Notes: NKR 1 and NKR 2 capture two lead variables for one and two years before a hospital joins
NKR, and NKR1 through NKR4 captures four lags that express years zero to three after participation
and year four onward.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the Distance from Recipient’s Location to the Hospital
Notes: The figure capture the distribution of the distance (in miles) recipients travel to their transplant
hospital.
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Figure 2.4: NKR adoption and patients moving behavior
Notes: The plots capture the distance recipients travel to their transplant hospital. It is divided into
recipients of living, deceased, and all transplants combined, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Spillover Effect of Surgeons on
Expanding the Use of
Kidney-Exchange Networks (with
Bobby W. Chung)
3.1 Introduction
National kidney-exchange networks create a large pool of incompatible patient-donor
pairs and find compatible matches for them within the pool of registered pairs. The adoption
of these networks is at the hospital level. Hospitals are responsible for informing their
patients of the available networks, and patient-donor pairs decide whether they want to
participate in that network. While one unified pool of patient-donor pairs with many
participants creates more potential for finding matches, the current trend shows the adoption
decision of hospitals in joining kidney-exchange networks happened in a balkanized fashion.
There are three national kidney-exchange networks currently active in the United States,
several multi-center programs, and numerous single-center ones with overlapping footprints.
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Furthermore, one-in-five hospitals choose not to join any of these national networks.
Previous literature documents two burdens that prevent hospitals from participating
in these national networks. The first reason is the conflict in the objective function of
hospitals that want to maximize the number of matches within their center, as opposed
to national networks that want to maximize the total number of transplants nationally
regardless of the hospital (Ashlagi and Roth 2014). The second theory argues the fixed
cost of entry prevents hospitals from participation (Agarwal et al. 2018). While these two
theories explain part of the behavior observed by some hospitals, a unified explanation for
the adoption behavior of all hospitals is missing from this literature.
This study adds to the existing theory by analyzing whether the links between
two hospitals, created by mutual surgeons between two hospitals, play a role in the
adoption decision of the National Kidney Registry (NKR). The role of opinion leaders
in the technology diffusion process of different industries, as well as medicine, has been
long documented (Comin, Dmitriev, and Rossi-Hansberg 2012; Escarce 1996; Baicker and
Chandra 2010; Rogers 2010). Coleman et al. (1957) argue that technology diffusion in
medicine shows the same trend as other industries with a significant role of interpersonal
networks. While the empirical evidence of these theories is limited due to identification
challenges (Agha and Molitor 2018), the introduction of kidney-exchange networks provides
an environment which enables one to overcome those identification issues.
We use data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) which
provides individual-level data on all the transplant recipients in the U.S. from 1988 to
2017. For each transplant, detailed information on the date of transplant, the hospital
that the operation happens in it, and the name and the ID of the surgeon who performs
the surgery is available. We define two hospitals as connected if one surgeon performs
transplant surgery in those two hospitals. Then we look at the effect of the hospital i’s
total number of connected hospitals who adopted the NKR, which we define as the spillover
measure, on the probability of hospital i’s participation in that network. Hospitals leave the
sample after adoption since we observe no exit, but they are still included in the number
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of connected hospitals. Since belonging to the same network might cause the incident of
a surgeon performing transplants in multiple centers as opposed to the reverse effect, we
restrict our hospitals’ connection formation to the period before the introduction of the
NKR.1
Another identification challenge in the network literature is the reflection problem,
which is due to the simultaneity in the behavior of the interacting hospitals. Specifically,
when we are studying the effect of the behavior of one hospital on the other one, it is hard
to distinguish the direction of this effect. To address this issue, we take two approaches.
First, we lag the spillover measure by one year. Second, we focus on the intransitive triad
or indirect links for the strict exogeneity requirement following Bramoulle et al. (2009).
In this method, to study the effect of hospital j’s decision on hospital i, we use hospital k
which is connected to j but not i as an instrument for j. This approach corrects for the
existence of omitted variable bias as well, conditional on the exogeneity of the instrument.
We also examine the non-linearity of the spillover effect by adding different degrees of the
polynomial of that effect to our specification. Furthermore, we focus on the strength of link
rather than the existence by differentiating between the effect of a surgeon based on the
number of surgeries they perform and the number of mutual surgeons between connected
hospitals.
Our results confirm the positive effect of surgeon’s spillover effect on the NKR
network adoption decision by hospitals. Specifically, we show that one more NKR adoption
by the connected hospitals increases the probability of the adoption in the original hospital
by about four percentage point. Our results hold after we address the reflection problem
using indirect connections as the instrumental variables. The IV approach shows a relatively
larger magnitude, although the downward bias of OLS is not significantly different. We
further find that the increase in the NKR adoption by the connected hospital increases
the probability of the focal hospital to participate in this network at a diminishing rate.
Finally, we find that superstar surgeons (those who perform more than the median number
1All the link formations are limited to the years 1988 to 2006.
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of transplants) have a larger influence on the participation decision of the hospital they are
active in as opposed to surgeons with a smaller number of transplants. Also, having more
than one mutual surgeon between two hospitals increases the spillover effect of surgeons.
3.2 Institutional Background
3.2.1 Creation of Kidney-Exchange Networks
A kidney transplant is the preferred treatment of choice for end-stage renal disease
(ESRD) patients, but there is a significant shortage of organs for transplant due to the
prohibition of monetary transactions for human organs by law. By 2017 about 110,000
patients were waiting on the long wait-list to receive a kidney transplant from a deceased
donor in the United States, while fewer than 12,000 of such operations are performed
annually. On the other hand, patients who have a family or friend who is willing to
donate one of their kidneys to them can receive a living transplant conditional on medical
compatibility requirements. Until 2004 getting a transplant from a living donor was only
available for medically compatible patient-donor pairs, and incompatible pairs had to wait
for a deceased kidney transplant.
Kidney-exchange transplants started on a small scale, in which transplant specialists
would find compatible matches within the pool of their incompatible patient-donor pairs.
Introduction of national kidney-exchange networks expanded this practice by creating
a platform for hospitals to register all these incompatible patient-donor pairs and find
compatible matches for those patients within a larger pool of registered donors.2 To
maximize the number of matches created from a national kidney-exchange program, the
need for a large unified pool of patients and donors where all hospitals participate in it
actively is necessary. Nonetheless, the evidence on the participation behavior of hospitals
shows incomplete or zero participation by some hospitals in national networks.
2Alvin Roth is one of the pioneers in this field by focusing on the introduction of a sufficient matching
algorithm for kidney paired donation (KPD) programs that can be used nationwide (Roth, So¨nmez, and
U¨nver 2004; Roth et al. 2005).
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Previous literature documents various reasons that prevent hospitals from
participating in such a unified network. Ashlagi and Roth (2014) argue that hospitals are
maximizing the number of transplants within their hospital, and their objective function
does not include all the patients in need of a kidney transplant who are not in their center.
This creates conflicting incentives between national kidney-exchange networks and hospitals,
which results in incomplete participation by a hospital.3 While this hypothesis supports
the deviation in the participation degree of hospitals, it does not provide any understanding
of zero participation of them. Another competing theory suggests that hospitals are
profit-maximizing like any other firms, and the fixed-cost of participation is preventing
them from joining (Agarwal et al. 2018). This theory explains the zero participation by
smaller hospitals in some networks, but it does not explain the decision of hospitals in not
joining some of these networks that are free of charge.
Furthermore, Ellison (2014) claims that his interviews with transplant coordinators
suggest that the contribution decision of hospitals is mainly driven by the perspective of
the transplant team about the performance of these networks. In light of this claim, we
assume one of the critical players in shaping the view of hospitals towards a new program are
surgeons. Therefore, we define a connection between two hospitals if a surgeon belongs to
those two hospitals, due to change of hospitals over time or performing surgery at multiple
centers at the time. Then we analyze the effect of these connections (defined as the spillover
effect) on the decision of hospitals to participate in the NKR network.
3.2.2 National Kidney-Exchange Networks
There are three major national pairing organizations in the United States. The
National Kidney Registry, the Alliance for Paired Donation, and the United Network for
Organ Sharing Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program. Each of these networks has some
hospitals (with transplant center) participants, and there are about 20% of hospitals that
are not participating in any of these networks.
3This conflicting incentives is captured in Figure 8 in the Appendix. They argue that hospitals first run
an internal matching, and only submit the remaining hard-to-match pairs to the national networks.
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The leading pairing organization in the U.S. is the National Kidney Registry (NKR),
largely due to the fact that it was the first major player to arrange exchanges nationwide
since 2007 effectively, and 96 transplant centers are currently using this program.4 The
pairing in this network is daily and based on medical compatibility and some recipients
preferences. The matching algorithm attempts to maximize the number of transplants,
except when there is a pair for hard-to-match patients or time is limited. The NKR dictates
the timetable and sets forth strict guidelines as to the transportation of kidneys between
centers, and charges hospitals a fee to cover operational costs that amount to roughly 5,000
dollars per transplant.
The Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) was founded initially in 2001 when Ohio’s
nine transplant centers joined together to engage in kidney paired donation with small
success. In May 2006, the group reorganized and started their nationwide program since
late 2007 and 83 transplant centers are currently using this program. APD is famous for
using a sophisticated but more restrictive matching software, which scores recipients based
on eight criteria, and performs match runs daily. Hospitals are in charge of coordination
after the APD found a match for them. The APD does not charge fees for its services;
instead, it relies entirely on philanthropic donations.
Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program (KPDPP) was initially proposed by United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) as early as 2004, UNOS performed its first match in
2010, starting with 77 transplant center participants and reaching 152 centers by the end of
2016. UNOS administers the nations deceased organ transplant system; therefore it enjoys
widespread access to hospitals across the country. The pairing process is performed weekly
based on medical compatibility, and some recipients and donors preferences which is more
restricted than NKR. The UNOS does not charge patients or hospitals beyond the flat
fee required to register for the UNOS kidney transplant waiting list, but hospitals are in
charge of arrangements after finding a match. Furthermore, it requires hospitals to provide
follow-up care for donors but does not reimburse hospitals’ fee of this follow-up care.
4Figure 3.2 captures all the NKR participant hospitals in the United States.
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The NKR network enjoys its first-mover advantage, with a strong reputation in
terms of the largest number of matches by allowing for the placement of the least amount
of restrictions on their algorithm. Furthermore, the restrictive schedule that they mandate
enables them to have the fastest and easiest process after finding the match. Between the
increase in the number of matches and the fastest matching procedure, the NKR is known
as the most effective national network in the United States. The other national networks
together constitute a small part of across hospitals exchange transplants. Therefore, the
focus of our analysis is on the NKR for the remainder of this paper.
3.3 Data Description
This study used data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR). The SRTR data system includes data on all donor, wait-listed candidates, and
transplant recipients in the US, submitted by the members of the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provides oversight to the activities
of the OPTN and SRTR contractors. For each transplant information on the date of
transplant, the hospital that the operation happens in it, and the name and the National
Provider Identifier (NPI) of the surgeon who performs the surgery is available.5
We drop 66,092 observations that have both missing surgeon’s name and surgeon’s
NPI. Further, we drop 25,647 surgeons who do not have an official 10-digit NPI. This
restricts our analysis to 326,088 transplants that have known surgeon name and NPI with
1,280 unique surgeon NPIs. We merge transplants data with the data from the NKR
network on the list of hospitals in the network by adoption year. The NKR started its
activity in 2007, beginning with one hospital. Table 3.1 shows the number of hospitals that
joined the NKR network each year, and by 2017 out of 239 active transplant centers in the
United States, 96 of them joined the NKR.
5The NPI number is a unique 10-digit identification number issued to covered health care providers by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
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To study the effect of surgeon’s spillover on the NKR adoption by a hospital, we
define links between two hospitals whenever surgeons perform transplant surgery in multiple
hospitals by the end of the year 2006. Specifically, whenever the same surgeon is observed
in hospital A and B, A and B are defined as connected. These links can be formed either
because surgeons are performing operations at more than one hospital at a time, or they
change hospital over time. We are limiting our link formation to the period before 2007
(before the introduction of NKR) to avoid selection. Specifically, we assume the link between
2 hospitals is formed randomly before 2007, and the NKR network does not affect the
relocation decision of surgeons, or their decision to perform surgery in multiple hospitals.
We use the described data to test whether the probability of adopting the NKR
network by a hospital increases as more of the connected hospitals by surgeons adopt this
network.
3.4 Empirical Framework
We estimate a local aggregate model in which an action by hospital i is determined
by the total effort made by i’s connected nodes (Calvo-Armengol and Zenou 2004).6
The adjacency matrix G is defined with each entry gij equals 1 if i and j are
connected and equals 0 otherwise.7 The spillover variable then is defined as the total
number of connected hospitals having adopted NKR by some point in time.
GNKRt,h = Total number of connected hospitals having adopted NKR by time t, (3.1)
6We define a utility maximization problem by hospital i in network r as
ui(yi, gij,r) = f(yi) + αyi
∑
j=1
gij,ryj ,
in which f(yi) captures the benefit and cost of effort yi, gij,r equals 1 if i and j are connected in network
r, and equals 0 otherwise. The reduced-form regression in Equation 3.2 is then obtained by deriving the
best-response function. This exercise also demonstrates the source of the reflection problem.
7For now, assume all hospitals belong to the same network.
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where
Yt,h =

0, if t < tˆ
1, if t ≥ tˆ
and tˆ refers to the year when hospital h adopts NKR, and the hospital leaves the sample
after adoption as we observe no exit. The reduced-form representation of the network model
is then defined as
Yt,h = β0 + β1GNKRt,h + Xt,hB + τt + σh + t,h, (3.2)
in which Xt,h refers to a vector of time-varying control variables at the hospital level
including the sum of living and deceased transplants in a hospital, population of the state
that the hospital is located in, percentage of female patients, and percentage of black
patients in that hospital. τt and σh are time and hospital fixed effects respectively. β1
is the coefficient of interest that measures the change in the probability of NKR adoption
at time t when the total number of adoption by connected hospitals changes by time t
(GNKRt,h).
In Equation 3.2, there are two identification challenge. The first problem is the
direction of the effect; i and j are connected, but we do not know whether i affects or being
affected by j. This is the renowned ‘reflection problem’ in the estimation of the spillover
effect due to the simultaneity of actions (Manski 1993). To augment Equation 3.2, we
replace the spillover measure with a lagged variable GNKRt−k,h, where k is the number of
lag chosen. The second issue is the omitted variable bias, and under strict exogeneity, we
do require an instrument to identify a causal effect (Bramoulle, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009).
We utilize the intransitivity in connections and use the aggregate adoption of indirect links
by time t− 1 (G2NKRt−1,h) as the instrument. Conditional on exclusion restriction, using
the number of indirectly connected hospitals as an IV corrects for the omitted variable
bias. Exclusion restrictions arise naturally from the non-overlapping nature of our hospital
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network. Our first stage is then defined as
GNKRt,h = α0 + α1G
2NKRt−1,h + Xt,hΓ + θt + φh + ut,h. (3.3)
Suppose i is connected with j and j is connected with k, but i and k are not. We can use the
behavior of k to instrument for the behavior of j. To ensure the exclusion restriction holds,
i.e. I,G, and G2 are linearly independent, common connections are eliminated in G2. Also,
the hospital network is assumed to be static after 2007 so that the non-overlapping nature
is not affected by the adoption of NKR.
3.5 Results
In Tables 3.3, we show that there is a positive relationship between the probability
of the NKR adoption by a hospital and the total number of adoption by its connected
hospitals. According to Column (1) of Table 3.3, one more adoption of connected hospitals
by period t increases the probability of adoption by the focal hospital in the same period by
3.73 percentage points. Based on Table 3.1 the average adoption rate is about 3.6 percent
through the years of 2007 to 2017, which implies that the spillover effect has a substantial
magnitude.
To correct for the reflection problem, we also look at the effect of the adoption of
NKR by the connected hospital with one year lag. As shown in Column (2) of Table 3.3,
the effect of one more adoption of connected hospitals by period t − 1 increases the
probability of adoption in the current period by 3.41 percentage points. Compared to
the contemporaneous effect in Column (1), the magnitude decreases by half of the standard
deviation. Nonetheless, the effect is still positive and statistically significant. Table 3.3
also captures the effect of an increase in the proportion of connected hospitals that adopted
NKR to account for the total number of links hospitals have.8 Based on the second part
8The proportion variable captures the number of connected hospitals that adopted NKR by year t over
the total number of connected hospitals. the sample is smaller because we omit hospitals with no connections
from this analysis.
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of Table 3.3, 10% increase in the proportion of connected hospitals by year t increases the
probability of adoption by the focal hospital by 1.74 percentage points.
We further address the reflection problem described in Section 3.4 by instrumenting
GNKRt using G
2NKRt−1. Because 11 hospitals are dropped when we use the lagged
variables, Column (1) of Table 3.4 reports the result of Panel OLS with a comparable
sample. In Column (2) of Panel A, the first stage result shows that 5 more total adoptions
from the indirectly connected hospitals will bring about 1 more total adoption from the
connected hospitals. Column (2) of Panel B in Table 3.4 reports the spillover effect at time
t in the second stage. When we compare the result in Column (1), the OLS estimates are
understated but the bias is not statistically significant.
In Table 3.5, we further explore the non-linearity of the spillover by adding different
orders of a polynomial. We do find a diminishing return to the total adoption as revealed
by the negative sign of the second degree in Column (2). The spillover effect becomes
insignificant until the 10th adoption (F statistics = 1.30).
3.6 Further Analysis
In the main analysis, a link between two hospitals is defined whenever the same
surgeon has ever performed surgery in both hospitals until 2006. In this section, we allow
the intensity of a connection to matter. That is, a ‘super’ surgeon may be more influential
in information transmission. This analysis is based on the finding by Agha and Molitor
(2018) that superstar physicians, measured by their trial role or citation history, have a
broader influence in the adoption of new cancer drugs by a hospital.
More specifically, we define a ‘super’ surgeon in a hospital by whether the number
of surgeries performed by a particular surgeon in the same hospital is above the median
of the number of surgeries of all surgeon-hospital pairs in our data. Figure 3.4 shows the
distribution of the number of surgeon-by-hospital surgeries and the median number is 35.
We then redefine the links between two hospitals into four types. We define a link as
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‘strong’ if the surgeon is a super surgeon in both hospitals; an ‘intermediate strong’ link is
defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only in Hospital i, whereas an ‘intermediate weak’
link is defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only in Hospital j; and a ‘weak’ link is
defined otherwise. This method of categorization indeed gives a good amount of variation
as reflected in Table 3.6.
We re-estimate the counterpart of Equation 3.2 separately for the four types and
report the results in Column (1) to (4), and jointly in Column (5) of Table 3.7. As reflected
in Column (5), the spillover from ‘weak’ links is small and insignificantly different from zero.
Moreover, the spillover from the ‘intermediate strong’ links is significantly larger than that
from ‘intermediate weak’ links and ‘weak’ links. The spillover from ‘strong’ links is also
significantly larger than that from ‘weak’ links. These results are intuitive and consistent
with the findings of Agha and Molitor (2018). As the number of transplants surgeons
performs in a hospital increases, their influence on the hospital-level decisions in that center
will become broader.
Another way to capture the strength of links between two hospitals is to look at the
number of mutual surgeons between two connected hospitals as opposed to the existence
of mutual surgeons. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the number of mutual surgeons
between two connected hospitals. This histogram shows that 85% of the connected hospitals
are linked through one mutual surgeon. Based on this graph, We define a link between two
hospitals as ‘weak’ if they only have one common surgeon, and ‘strong’ if they have two or
more common surgeons.
We re-estimate the counterpart of Equation 3.2 separately for the two types and
report the results in Column (1) to (2), and jointly in Column (3) of Table 3.8. As reflected
in Column (3), the spillover from hospitals with ‘weak’ links is about half of the size of
a spillover from hospitals with ‘strong’ links. These results are again consistent with the
information transmission idea, and it confirms that the influence of connected hospitals on
each other is more substantial when they have more than one mutual surgeons.
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3.7 Conclusion
As the use of national kidney-exchange networks expands the number of transplants
for incompatible patient-donor pairs, a question that arises is what makes some hospitals
more prone to participate in such networks. Specifically, we are interested in the role of
the opinion leaders in the network-adoption decision of a hospital. Our hypothesis is that
surgeons play a significant role in the idea transmission and the final decision of participation
by hospitals.
This study uses the unique data set of the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR) merged with NKR data on participant hospitals. The data allow us
to identify each transplant, the name and the ID of the surgeon who performed it, the
hospital that it took place in, and the subsequent participation status of that hospital in
the NKR in each year. We then define a link between two hospitals if those two hospitals
had a mutual surgeon who performed transplants in both hospitals. We limit these link
formations to the period before the introduction of the NKR network to avoid connections
that are made through this network.
Our estimates suggest that hospitals are more likely to adopt the NKR network if
surgeons in those hospitals were members of other NKR-participant hospitals. In particular,
one more adoption of NKR by connected hospitals increases the probability of adoption by
about four percentage points. We address the simultaneity of behavior, known as the
reflection problem, by lagging the spillover measure by one year. We further correct for the
omitted variable bias by using indirect links, known as intransitive triads, as an instrument
for direct links. Our results hold after addressing both of these identification challenges. We
also check the non-linearity of the spillover and find a diminishing magnitude in this effect.
Additionally, we divide hospitals into four types to investigate the effect of the superstar
surgeons by the number of transplants they performed in a hospital. We find that the higher
the number of transplants a surgeon performs in a hospital, the broader their influence in
the participation decision of that hospital. Finally, we divide hospitals based on the number
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of mutual surgeons that two connected hospitals share, and we define hospitals with more
than one mutual surgeon as a strong connection. Our result shows that the magnitude of a
spillover effect from strong links is twice the effect from weak links.
Our results are consistent with Agha and Molitor (2018) in terms of the direction
of the effect. They find prominent physicians play a vital role in the adoption of newly
invented cancer drugs by hospitals with a broader influence for the superstar physicians
(measured by their trial role or citation history). Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect
is larger in our estimates naturally because the adoption of the NKR network by connected
hospitals expands the potential size of the network for all the existing participants as well.
In other words, the expansion of the network is beneficiary for the influencer hospital as
well as the affected one.
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Table 3.1: Participation of Hospitals in NKR Over Years
Number of Total Number Percentage of Cumulative Percentage
Hospitals Joining of Hospitals New Participants of New Participants
Year:
2007 1 254 0.39 0.39
2008 10 249 4.02 4.41
2009 12 249 4.82 9.23
2010 15 244 6.15 15.38
2011 15 242 6.20 21.58
2012 13 240 5.42 27.00
2013 13 240 5.42 32.42
2014 8 236 3.39 35.81
2015 4 239 1.67 37.48
2016 4 236 1.69 39.17
2017 1 239 0.42 39.59
Notes: This table captures the pattern in which hospitals joined NKR network through years following
its introduction in 2007.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable mean sd min max
Own Characteristics (Average Across Time)
Adoption at time t 0.09 0.15 0.00 1.00
Number of Living Transplants at time t 22.10 27.03 0.00 138.50
Number of Deceased Transplants at time t 41.30 39.12 0.67 234.50
Population of the State the Hospital at time t 12.98 10.55 0.60 39.26
female 0.38 0.09 0.00 0.58
black 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.98
Network Characteristics (Static)
Direct connection 4.28 3.80 0.00 20.00
Indirect connection 16.34 15.27 0.00 75.00
Network Characteristics (Average Across Time)
Total adoption of hospital (directly connected) by time t 0.78 1.07 0.00 6.00
proportion of adoption by hospital (directly connected) by time t 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.90
Instruments (Average Across Time)
Total adoption of hospital (indirectly connected) by time t 3.24 3.88 0.00 16.82
Notes: This table captures the summary statistics of the variables of interest across all years. The
numbers are the average of collapsed data at the hospital level. The Number of hospitals observed in
the sample is 268.
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Table 3.3: Positive Correlation Between the Adoption Decision of Connected
Hospitals (Panel OLS)
(1) (2)
Total Adoption of Connected Hospitals by
time t 0.0373***
(0.0049)
time t-1 0.0341***
(0.0055)
Constant -0.183* -0.192
(0.107) (0.126)
Observations 2,076 1,800
R-squared 0.043 0.035
N of CTR ID 268 257
Proportion of Adoption by Connected Hospitals by
time t 0.1744***
(0.0262)
time t-1 0.1599***
(0.0289)
Constant -0.2312* -0.2490*
(0.1243) (0.147)
Observations 1,772 1,543
R-squared 0.043 0.036
N of CTR ID 221 214
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if hospital i joins NKR at time t. The hospital
leaves the sample after adoption (we observe no exit). The independent variable is the total number of
connected hospitals having joined NKR by different time t (GNKRt,h). Time-varying controls that are
not reported include sum of living and deceased transplants in a hospital, population of the state that
the hospital is located in, percentage of female patients, percentage of black patients. All regressions
include hospital and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: The Positive Spillover Remains Robust Under The Instrumental
Variable Strategy
(1) (2)
Panel OLS Panel IV
(Comparable Sample)
Panel A: First Stage
G2NKRt−1 0.195***
(0.00455)
F Stat. 1876.73
Panel B: Second Stage
Total Adoption of Friends at time t 0.0403*** 0.0523***
(0.00589) (0.00799)
Constant -0.178 -0.105
(0.125) (0.129)
Observations 1,800 1,800
Number of CTR ID 257 257
Notes 1: Instrument in the first stage includes G2NKRt−1: the total adoption of indirectly connected
hospitals by time t− 1.
Notes 2: Dependent variable in the second stage is an indicator equal to 1 if hospital i joins NKR at
time t. The hospital leaves the sample after adoption (we observe no exit). The independent variable
is the total number of connected hospitals having joined NKR by time t (GNKRt,h). Time-varying
controls that are not reported include sum of living and deceased transplants in a hospital, population
of the state that the hospital is located in, percentage of female patients, percentage of black patients.
All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: The Spillover Effect Exhibits A Diminishing Return (Panel OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Adoption of Friends at time t 0.0373*** 0.0669*** 0.0829***
(0.00498) (0.00929) (0.0160)
(Total Adoption of Friends at time t)2 -0.00558*** -0.0127**
(0.00148) (0.00592)
(Total Adoption of Friends at time t)3 0.000640
(0.000519)
Constant -0.183* -0.134 -0.128
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108)
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076
R-squared 0.043 0.050 0.051
Number of CTR ID 268 268 268
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if hospital i joins NKR at time t. The hospital
leaves the sample after adoption (we observe no exit). Time-varying controls that are not reported
include sum of living and deceased transplants in a hospital, population of the state that the hospital is
located in, percentage of female patients, percentage of black patients. All regressions include hospital
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Distribution of the Four Types of Links
Type of Links Percentage Frequency
Strong 22.80 414
Intermediate Strong 27.03 491
Intermediate Weak 27.03 491
Weak 23.13 420
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the four types of links. Total number of links are 1,816. A
‘strong’ link is defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon in both hospitals; an ‘intermediate strong’ link
is defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only in Hospital i, whereas an ‘intermediate weak’ link is
defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only in Hospital j; a ‘weak’ link is defined otherwise.
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Table 3.7: Spillover Effects From Strong and Intermediate-Strong Links Are
Larger (Panel OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strong Link 0.0589*** 0.0397***
(0.00963) (0.0106)
Intermediate Strong Link 0.0809*** 0.0511***
(0.0150) (0.0161)
Intermediate Weak Link 0.0314*** 0.0165**
(0.00707) (0.00808)
Weak Link 0.0377*** 0.00896
(0.0129) (0.0143)
Constant -0.288*** -0.275*** -0.347*** -0.373*** -0.186*
(0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076
R-squared 0.033 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.043
Number of CTR ID 268 268 268 268 268
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if hospital i joins NKR at time t. The hospital
leaves the sample after adoption (we observe no exit). A ‘strong’ link is defined if the surgeon is a super
surgeon in both hospitals; an ‘intermediate strong’ link is defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only
in Hospital i, whereas an ‘intermediate weak’ link is defined if the surgeon is a super surgeon only in
Hospital j; a ‘weak’ link is defined otherwise. Time-varying controls that are not reported include sum
of living and deceased transplants in a hospital, population of the state that the hospital is located in,
percentage of female patients, percentage of black patients. All regressions include hospital and year
fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Strong Links with Stronger Spillover Effect
(1) (2) (3)
Weak Link 0.0370*** 0.0329***
(0.00547) (0.00556)
Srong Link 0.0926*** 0.0701***
(0.0190) (0.0192)
Constant -0.224** -0.329*** -0.173
(0.107) (0.105) (0.107)
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076
R-squared 0.037 0.026 0.045
Number of CTR ID 268 268 268
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if hospital i joins NKR at time t. The hospital
leaves the sample after adoption (we observe no exit). A ‘strong’ link is defined if there are more
than one mutual surgeon between two hospitals; a ‘weak’ link is defined if there is only one mutual
surgeon between the two hospitals. Time-varying controls that are not reported include sum of living
and deceased transplants in a hospital, population of the state that the hospital is located in, percentage
of female patients, percentage of black patients. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.1: Hospitals’ Network Defined by Surgeons’ Movement
Notes: This graph shows the network of hospitals which is determined by the movement of surgeons
between hospitals before 2007. The colored dots indicate the hospital has adopted NKR during the
sample period.
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Figure 3.2: Map of the NKR Participant Hospitals
Notes: This graph captures all the NKR participant hospitals in the United States by the end of 2017.
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Figure 3.3: NKR Adoption between Directly and Indirectly Connected Hospitals
Notes: These histograms show the distribution of the number of connected hospitals and the number
of indirectly connected hospitals that adopted NKR during the sample period.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the Number of Surgeon-by-Hospital Surgeries
Notes: This histogram shows the distribution of the number of surgeon-by-hospital surgeries
(1987-2006). We define a ‘super’ surgeon if the number of surgeries in the same hospital is higher
than 35 (median).
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the Number of Mutual Surgeons
Notes: This histogram shows the distribution of the number of mutual surgeons between two connected
hospitals. We define a ‘weak’ link if there is only one common surgeon, and a ‘strong’ link if there are
two or more common surgeons between hospitals. This histogram shows that 85% of the links are defined
as ‘weak’ links.
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Appendix A The Effect of the National Kidney Registry on
the Probability of
Receiving a Transplant
Table 9: Testing Different Number of Knots on the Fit of the Model
Log-Likelihood DF AIC BIC
Number of Knots:
0 -577,593.1 1 1,155,268 1,155,724
1 -577,589.9 2 1,155,312 1,156,046
2 -576,677.4 3 1,153,465 1,154,076
3 -576,319.9 4 1,152,720 1,153,165
4 -576,269.1 5 1,152,620 1,153,076
5 -576,271.6 6 1,152,633 1,153,134
Note: The model that minimizes the AIC, which is defined as the log likelihood of the model times -2,
plus twice the number of model parameters, is the model with 4 knots (5 degrees of freedom), for which
AIC is equal to 1,152,620. The knots are placed at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th centiles of the uncensored
distribution of log times.(Durrleman and Simon, 1989)
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Table 10: Probability of Receiving a Transplant (Different Number of Knots)
0 Knot 1 Knot 2 Knots 3 Knots 4 Knots 5 Knots
NKR 1.0635 1.0635 1.0651 1.0653 1.0653 1.0653
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Patient’s Age 0.9893*** 0.9893*** 0.9894*** 0.9895*** 0.9895*** 0.9895***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BMI 0.9781*** 0.9781*** 0.9780*** 0.9780*** 0.9780*** 0.9780***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
O Blood-Type 0.7134*** 0.7132*** 0.7116*** 0.7115*** 0.7115*** 0.7116***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PRA 0.9912*** 0.9912*** 0.9911*** 0.9911*** 0.9911*** 0.9911***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 1.0905*** 1.0906*** 1.0907*** 1.0906*** 1.0905*** 1.0905***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Black 0.6899*** 0.6896*** 0.6884*** 0.6883*** 0.6883*** 0.6883***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Other Eth 0.7159*** 0.7157*** 0.7151*** 0.7152*** 0.7153*** 0.7153***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
College Educ 1.0741*** 1.0741*** 1.0746*** 1.0745*** 1.0745*** 1.0745***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Medicare 0.9025*** 0.9025*** 0.9034*** 0.9036*** 0.9036*** 0.9036***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Population 0.9653 0.9653 0.9656 0.9658 0.9658 0.9658
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 498,544 498,544 498,544 498,544 498,544 498,544
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported with corresponding standard errors.
The hazard ratio is calculated using a single-risk hazard function by fitting a cubic spline function
with a different number of knots for the baseline hazard. Coefficient estimates that are significant
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered at the hospital level.
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Table 11: Expanding the Data Set
Wait-Time Event Status
ID:
1 60 Transplant 0
1 60 Death/too Sick 0
1 60 Transferred 0
1 60 Transplant Elsewhere 0
2 25 Transplant 0
2 25 Death/too Sick 1
2 25 Transferred 0
2 25 Transplant Elsewhere 0
Notes: According to this table, each patient is at risk for one of the four events. Patient 1 has been followed
for 60 months (5 years) and did not experience any of the events in that period, so he is censored. Patient 2
was at risk of experiencing any of the events for 25 months, but then died and was removed from the waiting
list.
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Appendix B The Effect of the National Kidney Registry on
the Quality of Donors
Table 12: Evidence for the Existence of Imbalance Between Treatment
and Control Groups
(Non-NKR Hospitals) (NKR Hospitals) (t Test)
Transplant Numbers:
Exchange Transplants 0.48 1.15 -14.09
(0.62) ( 2.36)
Direct-Living Transplants 16.51 37.02 -24.17
(23.84) (32.83)
Deceased-Donor Transplants 27.70 51.27 -21.42
(32.08) (41.10)
Recipients’ Average Age 40.09 45.38 -12.82
(15.52) (9.08)
Hospital’s State Population 11,370.11 13,066.71 -5.64
(9,148.58) (10,692.42)
Notes: The reported means are for the period before the introduction of NKR (before 2008). NKR hospitals
are all hospitals that eventually join this network. Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 13: The Estimated Impact of the NKR Adoption on Different Typesof Transplants
exchange share direct living share deceased donor share
NKR 1.929*** -0.491 -1.697
(0.401) (1.074) (1.200)
Constant 0.200 41.23*** 58.56***
(0.138) (0.915) (0.947)
Observations 4127 4127 4127
Mean (Number) 2.49 33.30 63.98
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.272 0.153
F 19.58 32.11 13.92
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variables are the division of transplants into exchange, direct living, and deceased donor shares and counts in
a hospital/year. These shares are the number of such transplants over the total number of all transplants in a given hospital and year
multiplied by 100. Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at hospital level.
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Table 14: The Estimated Impact of the NKR Adoption on Different Types of
Transplants (After Matching)
exchange share direct living share deceased donor share
NKR 1.951*** -1.365 -0.909
(0.410) (1.083) (1.211)
Constant 0.286* 40.81*** 58.91***
(0.146) (0.934) (0.965)
Observations 3855 3855 3855
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.280 0.155
F 18.75 29.59 13.34
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variables are the division of transplants into exchange, direct living, and deceased donor shares and counts in
a hospital/year. These shares are the number of such transplants over the total number of all transplants in a given hospital and year
multiplied by 100. The regressions are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. Coefficient estimates that are significant
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at
hospital level.
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Table 15: The Estimated Impact of NKR Adoption on Different Types of
Transplants, 2005-2017
exchange share direct living share deceased donor share
NKR 2 -0.155 -1.112 1.096
(0.469) (1.215) (1.318)
NKR 1 -0.557 0.608 -0.220
(0.555) (1.349) (1.429)
NKR0 0.573 -0.463 -0.324
(0.717) (1.396) (1.602)
NKR1 1.108 -1.065 -0.457
(0.678) (1.503) (1.557)
NKR2 1.280* -2.352 0.790
(0.684) (1.660) (1.783)
NKR3 1.623* -3.346* 1.045
(0.830) (1.783) (1.938)
NKR4&forward 2.058** -2.733 -0.118
(0.811) (1.906) (2.089)
Observations 2332 2332 2332
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variables are the division of transplants into exchange, direct living, and deceased donor shares and counts
in a hospital/year. The regressions are weighted using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method. NKR dummies -2 to 3 are equal to 1
in only 1 year per adopting hospital. NKR4&forward dummy is equal to 1 in every year beginning with the fourth year of adoption.
Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses. They are clustered at hospital level.
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Figure 6: NKR adoption and its effect on transplant shares
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Figure 7: Illustration of Coarsened Exact Matching Method (Source: King 2018)
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Appendix C The Spillover Effect of Surgeons on Expanding
the Use of Kidney-Exchange
Networks
Figure 8: Conflicting Incentives of Hospitals and National Kidney-ExchangeNetworks
Notes: Patient-donor pairs a1 and a2 belong to hospital i, and b1 and b2 belong to hospital j. Hospital i
can arrange an internal match for both pair in its hospital, resulting in two transplants overall. Whereas,
by registering these pairs in a national network only one of the pairs in the hospital i gets a transplant,
but the total number of transplants increases to three. (source: (Ashlagi and Roth 2014))
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